Taxonomic Search: john OR hollerbach, Publications, Academia
This paper studies manufacturer incentives to invest in the improvement of reliability and security of a software system when (i) reliability and security failures are caused by the same errors in the development of the software components and (ii) naive users find it too costly to distinguish between these two classes of system failures.We trace the effects of these informational imperfections and discuss how the resulting supply and demand externalities affect manufacturer investments.
The interdependent nature of security on the Internet causes a negative externality that results in under-investment in technology-based defences. Previous research suggests that, in such an environment, cyber-insurers affect network security and user welfare. We utilize a general setting, where the network is populated by identical users with arbitrary risk-aversion and network security is costly for the users. In our model, a user's probability to incur damage (from being attacked) depends on both his security and the network security.
What is it that pushes us to seek fame by misconduct or publicity by sharing embarrassing information with strangers? How do we reconcile these desires with the apparent need for privacy that surveys keep finding so widespread among the American population? In short, what drives individuals to reveal, and to hide, information about themselves to and from others?
This paper investigates how competitive cyber-insurers affect network security and welfare of the networked society. In our model, a user’s probability to incur damage (from being attacked) depends on both his security and the network security, with the latter taken by individual users as given.