A Verifiable Framework for Cyber‐Physical Attacks and Countermeasures in a Resilient Electric Power Grid
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Abstract:
The electric power CPS faces an alarmingly high risk of catastrophic damage from cyber-‐attacks. However, modeling cyber-‐attacks, evaluating consequences, and developing appropriate countermeasures require a detailed, realistic, and tractable model of electric power CPS operations. The primary barrier is the lack of access to models for the complex legacy proprietary systems that the electric power grid has relied on for decades. This research overcomes these challenges with the development of an attack-‐verifying (verifiable) software framework that will capture the electric power system operations in adequate detail. Cyber threats will be verified using this framework through a combination of sound theoretical methods and an open-‐source commercial simulation engine accessible via a unique transition to practice (TTP).
This research focuses on four fundamental and related thrusts: (i) identifying classes of cyber-‐attacks with quantifiable physical consequences and developing detection-‐based countermeasures; (ii) identifying communication attacks on distributed grid operations and developing information-‐sharing countermeasures; (iii) developing a verifiable software framework which models the spatio-‐temporal operations of the electric grid in tandem with Thrusts 1 and 2 to verify attack models, evaluate countermeasures, and develop new resiliency protocols; and (iv) a TTP project, in collaboration with industry-‐leading experts from IncSys and PowerData, to develop commercial grade open source power simulation software packages to integrate and test the attacks and countermeasures of Thrusts 1-‐-‐3 as well as develop workforce training curriculum for North American Electric Reliability Council (NERC) certification. This research also includes engagement with K-‐-‐12 students via the Arizona Science Laboratory program.
Submitted by Lalitha Sankar
on
Abstract:
The electric power CPS faces an alarmingly high risk of catastrophic damage from cyber-‐attacks. However, modeling cyber-‐attacks, evaluating consequences, and developing appropriate countermeasures require a detailed, realistic, and tractable model of electric power CPS operations. The primary barrier is the lack of access to models for the complex legacy proprietary systems that the electric power grid has relied on for decades. This research overcomes these challenges with the development of an attack-‐verifying (verifiable) software framework that will capture the electric power system operations in adequate detail. Cyber threats will be verified using this framework through a combination of sound theoretical methods and an open-‐source commercial simulation engine accessible via a unique transition to practice (TTP).
This research focuses on four fundamental and related thrusts: (i) identifying classes of cyber-‐attacks with quantifiable physical consequences and developing detection-‐based countermeasures; (ii) identifying communication attacks on distributed grid operations and developing information-‐sharing countermeasures; (iii) developing a verifiable software framework which models the spatio-‐temporal operations of the electric grid in tandem with Thrusts 1 and 2 to verify attack models, evaluate countermeasures, and develop new resiliency protocols; and (iv) a TTP project, in collaboration with industry-‐leading experts from IncSys and PowerData, to develop commercial grade open source power simulation software packages to integrate and test the attacks and countermeasures of Thrusts 1-‐-‐3 as well as develop workforce training curriculum for North American Electric Reliability Council (NERC) certification. This research also includes engagement with K-‐-‐12 students via the Arizona Science Laboratory program.