

Module on Network Security Games



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Objectives

We developed a game theory module with focus on network security to teach UG/G students and professional engineers using interactive simulations of network games:

- * Water network management
 - * From single decision maker
 - To decentralized control
- Impacts of CPS failures
 - Disturbance propagation
 - * Contaminant spread
- * Strategic sensing & response
 - Game theory (network games)
 - Detection theory



Network failures: bursts/leaks, contamination





Offerings

- * MIT Freshman Pre-orientation programs (Sept., 2015)
- * Practitioners & professional engineers at Harvard Conf. (Oct., 2015)



- * Upcoming:
 - "Game Theory for Infrastructure Security" to be offered during IAP 2016 to MIT Freshmen
 - Exercises will be included in UG Systems core subject: "Principles of Energy and Water Sustainability"



Outline and Learning goals

- 1. Large-scale simulation of attack scenario on water networks
 - Real-world attack models
 - * Effectiveness of defender (network operator) strategies
 - Simulations using EPANet
- 2. Decision theory
 - * Game theory: Nash equilibrium, learning in games (fictitious play)
 - * Computing equilibria: Prisoner's dilemma, matching pennies, ...
 - * Optimization: Set cover, facility location, network flow problems



Back-flow attack scenario on real-world networks

Dover, NJ

- Nodes: 14,945
- Pipes: 16,056
- Length: 484 [mi]





Back-flow attack scenario: disturbance propagation

Dover, NJ

- Nodes: 14,945
- Pipes: 16,056
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Decision theoretic concepts using benchmarks: Anytown water network

22 nodes





Sensor placement on Anytown network



11





Sensor placement for complete detection

Minimum set cover





Attacker – Defender game

Players:

- Defender: sensing over nodes
- Attacker: interdicting pipes

Rules:

- A sensor can detect an attack within a range of 1.8 [mi]
- Defender can sense 3 nodes
- Attacker can attack 3 pipes
- Players play simultaneously
- Utility of the defender: #detections
- Utility of the attacker: #attacks #detections

Objective:

Maximize individual utility



Game interface





Results: Learning via repeated play



Attackers – Defenders team game

Players:

- Team of Attackers: interdicting pipes
- Team of Defenders: sensing over nodes

Information and Actions:

- A sensor can detect an attack within a range of 1.8 [mi]
- Each attacker can attack 3 pipes
- Each defender can sense 3 nodes
- Each attack is paired up against each defense strategy

Payoffs:

- Utility of the attacker: AVERAGE(#attacks #detections)
- Utility of the defender: AVERAGE(#detections)
- Maximize average utility



Results: Exploration vs Exploitation





Student quotes

Isaac Guerrero '19

- "This is the first time I've been exposed to optimization and game theory. It
 was interesting to see firsthand the varying strategies people have developed
 and tested, and compare my own strategies. It was even interesting to see
 which of my theories were unsuccessful."
- Alexander Lynch '19
 - "[The module] was fun and really exhilarating. I actually learned a decent amount from the class. Initially, I focused more on the attack side rather than the defense which I think is the harder part personally."
 - "My favorite part of the module was getting super radical at the end. By the
- Bridget Bassi '17
 - "I chose a systems core at the beginning of this year. I was looking for something a little bit different than the traditional civil engineering route – I'm particularly excited to explore data sets, analyze them, and also delve into the real world applications that associated with civil engineering."
 - "Listening to Professor Amin's research was very interesting it mostly struck me because of how applicable it is in a real-world scenario using strategies such math, graph and game theory. It helps to have a greater understanding of everyday instances and everyday networks."