



Guarding Networks Through Heterogeneous Mobile Guards

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Motivation

- * Mobile guards (such as UAVs) are being increasingly used for the surveillance and monitoring of critical infrastructure networks such as gas and oil pipelines.
- * Advantages include
 - * increased efficiency,
 - * deployment in remote areas,
 - * cost-effectiveness,
 - * immediate response etc.




Motivation



British petroleum testing for use of UAVs in pipeline inspection at Prudhoe Bay, Alaska.

(Source: <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=UOorgiS3wgw>)

Outline




Monitoring through Mobile Guards

- * Mobile guards can be equipped with sensors that can detect some event or measure some physical parameter within a certain *range*
- * Mobile guards can perform remote attestation of cyber infrastructure devices by executing a query-response protocol
- * Using mobile guards (possibly in conjunction with static sensors), how can we *efficiently* monitor networks for concerned events (intrusion detection, leak detection etc.)?
- * **Challenges:** Using the capabilities of mobile guards (such as ranges) and considering the network structure
 - * How many guards should be deployed?
 - * At what critical points within the networks?
 - * What could be the movement strategies of guards?

Monitoring through Mobile Guards


- * We study the problem using a **graph-theoretic** set up.
 - * A network is modeled by a **graph**
 - * Mobile guards are located at nodes
 - * They can detect an event that occurs at some node within its **range** (k-hop), which depends on *physical aspects* of the network.
 - * Mobile guards respond by moving towards the affected node
- * We want to achieve complete monitoring of the network at all times even when guards move within the network in response to a **sequence** of events



Case: Single Event

* How to distribute guards such that each node is protected by at least one guard?

* Ans. **Dominating set:** $D \subseteq V$, s.t. $\bigcup_{v_i \in D} \mathcal{N}[v_i] = V$




● Guards

A single attack ✓



A seq. of attacks ✗

Case: Sequence of Events

- * Distribute guards that can defend against a **sequence** of single vertex attacks by a single guard shift along the edges.
- * Ans. **Eternal security in graphs**



Major Issues




Major Issues

Eternal Security

No. of guards

Deployment of guards

Guards' movements in case of activity




Major Issues

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
Deployment of guards

Guards' movements in case of activity



Heterogeneous Guards

- * **Heterogeneity:** Guards may have different ranges from each other.



● Range = 1

● Range = 2

Problem Formulation

- * Set of guards: $\mathcal{S} = \{s_1, \dots, s_\sigma\}$; Ranges: $\mathcal{R} = [r_1, \dots, r_\sigma]$
- * Vertex at which s_i is located at time $k = f_k(s_i)$
- * $f : (\mathcal{S}, k) \rightarrow V$
- * Vertices at which guards are located at $k = f_k(\mathcal{S}) = \{f_k(s_i) : s_i \in \mathcal{S}\}$
- * A **vertex v is secured** whenever $\exists s_i : d(f_k(s_i), v)_G \leq r_i$
- * $f_k(\mathcal{S})$ is a **secure configuration** whenever all vertices are secured.
- * **Eternal Security :**

$f_k(\mathcal{S})$ leads to $f_{k+1}(\mathcal{S})$; $\forall k$
Secure configuration Secure configuration

where, $|f_{k+1}(\mathcal{S}) - f_k(\mathcal{S})| \leq 1$




A Solution (Clustering)

Partition a graph G into clusters C_i , s.t.

$$d(u, v)_G \leq r_i \\ u, v \in C_i$$

Assign a single guard s_i with a range r_i to a cluster C_i .

A guard s_i eternally secures the vertices in **cluster C_i only**



$$\mathcal{S} = \{s_1, s_2, s_3\}$$


$$\mathcal{R} = [1, 2, 3]$$

Clustering based approach

Clustering Algorithm


Inputs:	G ;	$\alpha = [\alpha_1, \dots, \alpha_\sigma]$;	$\beta = [\beta_1, \dots, \beta_\sigma]$
	Network	Guards' ranges	Guards' numbers
Graph powers:	G^{α_1}	G^{α_2}	\dots G^{α_σ}
Maximal cliques:	M_1	M_2	\dots M_σ
	$\mathcal{M} = [M_1 \quad M_2 \quad \dots \quad M_\sigma]$		
Greedy step:	Pick the column, $m \in M_j$, with the max. no. of uncovered nodes		
Condition:	If guards with range α_j used are less than β_j		
Cluster:	Make a cluster consisting of nodes in m		
Update \mathcal{M} and repeat the greedy steps			

$$\alpha = [1 \ 2]; \quad \beta = [1 \ 1];$$



$$M_1 = \begin{bmatrix} 1 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 \\ 1 & 1 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 \\ 0 & 0 & 1 & 1 & 1 & 0 & 0 \\ 0 & 1 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 1 & 0 \\ 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 1 \\ 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 1 & 1 \end{bmatrix} \quad M_2 = \begin{bmatrix} 1 & 1 & 0 & 0 \\ 1 & 0 & 1 & 0 \\ 1 & 1 & 1 & 1 \\ 1 & 1 & 1 & 1 \\ 0 & 1 & 0 & 1 \\ 0 & 0 & 1 & 1 \end{bmatrix}$$

$$\mathcal{M} = \begin{bmatrix} & & & & & & & & & & \\ & & & & & & & & & & \\ & & & & & & & & & & \\ & & & & & & & & & & \\ & & & & & & & & & & \\ & & & & & & & & & & \\ & & & & & & & & & & \\ 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 1 & & & & \\ 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 1 & 1 & 1 & 0 & 1 & \end{bmatrix}$$



Clustering Algorithm


Proposition:

- Clustering is NP-hard.
- For a given set of guards along with their ranges, if Op is the maximum number of vertices that can be included in some cluster, then the algorithm includes at least $(1 - 1/e) \cdot Op$ number of vertices in some cluster.


- If there are ℓ clusters, and each node is equally likely to be attacked, then the *average distance* moved by a guard is

$$\frac{1}{n} \left[\sum_{i=1}^{\ell} \ell \frac{1}{(n_i - 1)} \sum_{u, v \in C_i} d_G(u, v) \right]$$

- The clustering here is related to the low diameter decomposition of a graph. However,




We cannot obtain two induced subgraphs, each having a diameter 2



It is possible to eternally secure a graph with two guards each having a range 2

Example

	Cluster for range 3
	Clusters for range 2
	
	Clusters for range 1
	
	
	Nodes not in any cluster




$$\alpha = \begin{bmatrix} 1 & 2 & 3 \end{bmatrix}$$
$$\beta = \begin{bmatrix} 3 & 2 & 1 \end{bmatrix}$$

A random (ER) graph with 50 nodes and $p=0.08$ (average degree = 4)

Example




$$\alpha = \begin{bmatrix} 2 & 3 & 4 \end{bmatrix}$$
$$\beta = \begin{bmatrix} 4 & 4 & 4 \end{bmatrix}$$



A water distribution network with 126 nodes and 168 pipes

Further Directions


- * **Communication between guards:** What are the implications if moving guards with heterogeneous ranges also communicate with each other? How the solution will change?
 - * e.g., If multiple guards move in response to an activity on a node, the number of guards required for eternal security might be lesser.



- * **Comparing solutions:** The pairs (α_1, β_1) and (α_2, β_2) are both solutions. How can we associate a cost with a solution?
- * **Dynamic graphs:** How can we solve eternal security problem for changing network topology?

Further Directions

- * **Static and Mobile guards:** How can we combine (inexpensive) static sensors and sophisticated mobile guards to obtain more efficient monitoring in CPS?
 - * e.g., Fault detection and localization in flow networks




- (inexpensive) static sensors
- mobile guards

Thank You

Remark

- * Eternal security is an example of ‘rotating between solutions’ concept.
- * Example: Consider a typical sensor scheduling problem



- * In the case of eternal security, a solution remains a solution whenever one of the guards moves towards its ‘neighbors’ in response to an activity on the neighbor node
- * Scheduling condition: An event on one of the nodes (discrete event dynamic system)
- * New solution: Previous solution except a change in the position of one of the guards