

FRESCO: Fast, Resilient, and Cost-Optimal Co-Designs for Wide-Area **Control of Power Systems**

North Carolina State University, +Massachusetts Institute of Technology, and ++Information Sciences Institute at University of Southern California

CPS PROJECT NUMBERS:-1544871, 1544751, 1544742

Project Goal

To co-design communication, control, and decisionmaking algorithms for fast, resilient and costoptimal wide-area control of power systems using massive volumes of Synchrophasor data

• Inter-area oscillation damping – output-feedback based MIMO control design for large power transmission systems to shape the closed-loop dynamic responses of power flows and frequencies using real-time Synchrophasor data

• System-wide voltage control – PMU-measurement based MIMO control design for coordinated setpoint control of voltages across large inter-ties using FACTS controllers (SVC, CSC, STATCOM)


• <u>Safe islanding</u> – use PMU data to continuously track *critical cutsets* of the network graph – i.e., minimum set of tie-lines lines carrying max sets of dynamic power flows

Technical Approach

Intellectual Merits:

- Distributed power oscillation damping control
- Distributed voltage control
- Distributed middleware
- 5. Experimental verification using DETER security testbed

Proposed Distributed Cyber-Physical Architecture for Wide-Area Control:




Primary questions:


- How to co-design distributed optimal controllers in sync with delay bounds of wide-area comm. networks
- 2. How to optimally allocate investment costs of communication infrastructure to different utility companies
- How to make WAMS resilient to Denial-of-Service, data manipulation, and other forms of cyber attacks.

Wide-Area Control


Coordination of multiple Phasor Measurement Units (PMUs) with multiple control actuators such as Power System Stabilizers (PSS) and FACTS devices to satisfy a global control goal in a distributed fashion over a secure communication network



New Control Algorithms



Consider the power system model with swing + excitation dynamics:



$$y = \operatorname{col}_{i \in \mathcal{S}}(\Delta V_i, \, \Delta \theta_i).$$

Choose *m* generators for implementing wide-area control via ΔE_{F} . Let the measurements available for feedback for the j^{th} controller be $y_i(t)$. Let $Y(t,\tau) =$ $[y(t - \tau_i)]$ where τ_i is signal transmission delay. Let τ be the vector of all such delays.

Define a performance metric \mathcal{J} to quantify the closed-loop damping of the slow eigenvalues of A. Let \mathcal{P} denote the set of all possible models resulting from parameter/structural variations in the system. Design an output-feedback dynamic controller $F(Y(t,\tau))$ that solves:

$\min \max \mathcal{J}$

Potential approaches: . Delay-aware and sparsity-promoting optimal control designs

- 2. Distributed MPC
- 3. Graph-theoretic control designs for shaping eigenvalues and eigenvectors (convex optimization)


Aranya Chakrabortty^{*}, Alexandra Duel-Hallen^{*}, Anuradha Annaswamy⁺, Alefiya Hussain⁺⁺

Game Theory for Cost Effectiveness

The cost for *renting* bandwidth and channel links vary depending on the criticality of the scenario and on the need for feedback.

The main question is - how much is each company willing to pay off in sharing the network cost?

Our approach is to treat the utility companies as *players in* a cooperative network formation game to jointly minimize a global performance metric, and thereby determine the required communication cost and its fair allocation using Nash Bargaining Solution




Cyber-Security of Wide-Area Control

Develop security solutions that operate efficiently under different real-world constraints of wide-area communication, and that cyber-security defense design has to be done strategically with an understanding of economic constraints.

Proposed approaches:

- 1. Threat Modeling
- 2. Enumerating the Attack Space from PMU data and Controller Signals
- Intrusion Resilience via Response Graphs
- 4. Allocating Cost of Resilience via Game Theory

Experimental Testbed




- Participated in Smart America Challenge 2014 Initiative of NIST and US White House

Broader Impacts

- Undergraduate, K-12 and minority education via Science House and FREEDM ERC programs at NC State
- Women's education program at MIT and USC
- Undergraduate summer internship at Information Science Institute at USC Industry collaborations with power utilities and software vendors via TTP

Federated DETER Cyber-Security Testbed Multi-vendor PMU-based hardware-in-loop simulation testbed at NCSU and DETERLab at Univ. of Southern California to showcase resiliency of distributed wide-area control





Massachusetts **Institute of Technology**

NC STATE UNIVERSITY

Information Sciences Institute

USC Viterbi School of Engineering