

### Goals

#### Motivation:

- ▶ CPS ubiquitous and security is critical
- ▶ Address synchronized attacks on sensors/actuators, plants and networks
- ▶ Information security insufficient

#### Approach:

- ▶ Develop holistic CPS security framework.
- ▶ Exploit physical system properties + mathematical models → devise provably secure protocols
- ▶ Validation on CPS testbeds

### Main Contribution

#### Technical achievements:

- ▶ Secure estimation
- ▶ Secure active sensing
- ▶ SMT solvers for CPS security
- ▶ Software obfuscation
- ▶ Interactive wireless security
- ▶ Secure and private distributed control

**Academic impact:** Over 50 publications (to date) in top-tier conferences and journals, along with recognitions through paper awards. Over 30 plenary lectures, tutorials and invited talks by PIs.

**Press coverage:** In Wired magazine, IEEE Spectrum etc.

**Connecting to DARPA:** Ideas from project used by DARPA's red team in HACMS project.

### Secure Computation from Leaky Correlated Randomness

#### Motivation

- ▶ Secure control requires to compute functions securely
- ▶ A functionality for secure computation: Random oblivious transfer correlations
- ▶ How much leakage is tolerable when recovering oblivious transfer correlations

#### Results

- ▶ Fractional leakage of 1/4 bits is achievable for oblivious transfer → Optimal for oblivious transfer!
- ▶ Show existence of a correlation which is more tolerable than oblivious transfer correlations → tolerates up to 1/2 fractional leakage

### Secure active sensing: attacks and defenses

#### Motivation

- ▶ Readings from the wheel sensors affect the behavior of the vehicle Anti-lock Brake System (ABS)
- ▶ ABS sensors can be spoofed through a relatively simple mechanism of a **non-invasive** attack
- ▶ If one or more of these sensors is compromised, the ABS can be tricked into thinking that the car is operating nominally when in fact the car has entered a potentially life-threatening skid
- ▶ Devise security mechanisms and characterize fundamental limitations on the attacker imposed by nature




Figure : Consequences of an ABS attack

#### Defense Mechanism

- ▶ Detecting sensor attacks is an authentication problem
- ▶ By placing "physical" challenges, a secure sensor can authenticate if the response is from a "trusted" gear
- ▶ Challenge: changing the magnetic field, randomly, from ON to OFF and from OFF to ON
- ▶ Attacker side: Small probability of detection → Fundamental delayed response to the challenge
- ▶ Use the delay in order to detect the attack or even securely sense




Figure : Challenge-Response Mechanism

#### Results

- ▶ Accurate detection of adversarial attack, and estimate the wheel's speed




Figure : Performance of defense scheme




Figure : Estimation scheme

### Secure MMSE estimation and SMT solvers

#### Motivation


- ▶ Critical infrastructures supported by feedback control loops
- ▶ Attacking sensors and actuators can disable control mechanism
- ▶ Stochastic dynamical systems under attack experience adversarial noise along with measurement and process noise
- ▶ State estimation → basic component!

#### Approach

- ▶ Previous works considered secure estimation and control for deterministic dynamical systems
- ▶ Develop optimal MMSE estimation in the presence of adversarial attacks on the measurements of the sensors
- ▶ The proposed state estimator involves Kalman filters operating over subsets of sensors to search for a sensor subset which is reliable for state estimation
- ▶ To improve the subset search time: propose Satisfiability Modulo Theory (SMT) based techniques to exploit the combinatorial nature of searching over sensor subsets

#### Main Results

- ▶ A cross-validating estimation architecture that asymptotically achieves the MMSE performance when we know which measurements were attacked
- ▶ Coding-theoretic interpretation for the necessary and sufficient conditions for secure state estimation in deterministic dynamical systems



**Resilient test**  
Sensor subset  $s \in \{1, 2, \dots, p\}$ ;  $|s| = p - k$   
Block residue:  $r_s(t) = y_s(t) - E(y_s(t) | x^{(0)})$   
Check: sample avg. of  $r_s(t) \in [-\epsilon, \epsilon] \forall t \in T$   
(with attacks) (attack-free)




Figure : Comparison of sensor subset search times




Figure : Coding-theoretic interpretation for secure state estimation