


**The purpose of the project includes:**


- (1) to investigate diverse integrity and trust issues in hardware Intellectual Properties (IPs);
- (2) to develop a scalable trust validation framework to verify IP trust and security from the perspective of functional, structural and parametric verification approaches.




Malicious modifications of integrated circuits are referred as *Hardware*

*Trojans*. In an untrusted design or fabrication facility an adversary can alter the original design to:

- Change the functionality
- Leak secret information
- Disable the circuit




Existing countermeasures against hardware Trojans:



## Security Validation using Symbolic Algebra

Traditional equivalence checking using SAT solver lead to state space explosion when Large IP blocks are involved.




➤ We propose a equivalence checking and Trojan localization method based on the Gröbner basis.

➤ Specification polynomials are obtained as:

$$S = \{f_{spec\_1}, f_{spec\_2}, \dots, f_{spec\_n}\}$$

➤ Gate level circuit  $C$  converted to polynomials:

$$F = \{f_{imp\_1}, f_{imp\_2}, \dots, f_{imp\_s}\}$$



➤ Specification polynomials

$$f_{spec1}: n_1 - (A+n_2 \cdot 2 \cdot A \cdot n_2) = 0$$


$$f_{spec2}: Z - (n_1 \cdot B) = 0$$

➤ Implementation polynomials

$$f_{imp1}: n_1 - (n_2 \cdot w_4 \cdot A - n_2 \cdot w_4 + w_4 \cdot n_2 \cdot A) = 0$$

$$f_{imp2}: w_4 - (A - n_2 \cdot A) = 0$$

$$f_{imp3}: Z - (n_1 \cdot w_4 \cdot C \cdot B - n_1 \cdot w_4 \cdot C - n_1 \cdot B + 1) = 0$$



➤ Trojan gates can be identified by analyzing remainder after reduction.

Equivalence checking and Trojan localization

➤ Each  $f_{spec}$  is reduced w.r.t Gröbner basis  $G$

➤  $f_{spec}$  can be reduced by  $g_{lj}$ , if  $lm(g_{lj}) | lm(f_{spec})$

$$r = f_{spec} - lt(f_{spec}) / lt(g_{lj}) \cdot g_{lj} \text{ or } f_{spec} \rightarrow g_{lj} + r$$

➤  $f_{spec}$  can be reduced by set  $G$

$$f_{spec} \rightarrow G^+ + r$$


•  $r \neq 0 \rightarrow$  security threat

•  $r = 0 \rightarrow$  the region is of safe functionality

## Side-Channel based Test Generation for Trojan Detection

➤ Existing approaches in two directions:

- Test generation: Difficult to generate tests since Trojans are usually stealth.
- Side-channel analysis: Sensitive to process noise for ultra-small Trojans.





➤ Our statistical approach can improve the sensitivity of side-channel based Trojan detection, by generating high-quality tests.

➤ **MERS** (Multiple Excitation of Rare Switching) aims at generating high-quality tests for each rare node to switch for at least  $N$  times.


➤ MERS maximizes the activation probability for arbitrary Trojans with any trigger condition.

➤ MERS maximizes the detection sensitivity of unknown "stealthy" Trojans, by amplifying its effect in side-channel signature.

➤ Our simulation platform inserts large number of arbitrary Trojans in a design and shows that the proposed approach is highly effective in detecting them.



Trojan activity increases as  $N$  increases, which shows the effectiveness of MERS in creating switching in Trojans.



The optimized test patterns MERS-h and MERS-s (with weight  $C=1-10$ ) can further increase the side channel sensitivity.