




INFORMATION AND COMPUTATION HIERARCHY FOR SMART GRIDS

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
Georgia State U: Wenzhan Song

The oldest, largest, & most complex CPS



Possibly the oldest, the largest and one of the most complex CPS

- ❑ ~10,000 plants, ~15,000 generators
- ❑ Miles of lines and costly equipment




Emerging operating regimes



- ❑ Greater renewable (**stochastic and varying**) and distributed generation
- ❑ Large scale consumer participation through **demand response**
- ❑ Increasing reliance on **cyber infrastructure** transmission and distribution. **Security and privacy!**
- ❑ Disruptive technologies in **storage** and **electric vehicles**

Technology drivers




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- ❑ **PMUs**: high resolution measurements for enhanced observability in time and space.
- ❑ **Smart meters**: enhanced observability in the distribution network
- ❑ **Smart wireless devices and apps**: empower user participation.
- ❑ **Cloud computing**: unprecedented computation power and storage capability

What makes the future grid different....

5



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Stochasticity:

- ❑ Non-Gaussian, long range dependencies and heavy tail phenomenon
- ❑ Rare events with enormous cost
- ❑ Contingencies with uncountable # scenarios.

Big data over cyber infrastructure:

- ❑ Cross-network, multi-scale, multi-modality, locational, bad, and malicious
- ❑ Impractical to communicate, no place to store, overwhelming in size and complexity, difficult to learn, and possibly dangerous to use

Information and computation hierarchy

- ❑ **Networking architecture**

Public and private infrastructure

- ❑ **Computation architecture**

HPC, cloud

- ❑ **Quality of service:**

Speed, delay, reliability, risk (not just in average)

- ❑ **Robustness, tolerance, resilience**


missing packets, inconsistency, bad and malicious data...

- ❑ **Complexity, costs, security, privacy, etc.**


Information hierarchy in space

- ❑ **Information hierarchy in space** addresses the problem of collecting and disseminating information to a large geographical area.
- ❑ **CAP:** a fundamental limit on distributed reliable processing.
 - ❑ **C**onsistency: see the same data at the same time
 - ❑ **A**vailability: all response upon request
 - ❑ **P**artition tolerance: fault tolerant (e.g. N-1 contingencies)
- ❑ **Locality:** information generated at different locations may be inconsistent, out of date, erroneous, even malicious.

Example: cybersecurity of smart grid




Man-in-the-middle attack




Attack objectives:

- ❑ **mislead** the control about the topology and the state of the network;
- ❑ make the attack **undetactable**

Impacts of data and topology attacks





- ❑ Data attack changes LMP via state estimates.





- ❑ Topology attack changes LMP directly.

Topology attacks are more powerful



Change a few (<5) meter data and use only local information!

Against joint topology & data attacks



Making attack detectable by protecting

- ❑ ~30% meters (IEEE 14 bus)
- ❑ ~25% meters (IEEE 118 bus)

Information hierarchy in time

- ❑ **Information hierarchy in time** addresses the problem of what kind of information is required and by what time decisions have to be made.
- ❑ **Time sensitive decisions are essential** for the integration of stochastic generations and demand response.
- ❑ **The value of information** diminishes if it is not delivered in time. Is TCP/IP framework good enough?

Example: Risk Limiting Dispatch


Existing modus operandi
(day ahead + real time)

- Decoupled dispatch
- Static reliability criteria
- Limited recourse opportunities
- Demand treated as inelastic

CAISO study: with 33% renewable


- Regulation capacity: 227MW \rightarrow 1,135MW.
- Load following capacity: 2,292MW \rightarrow 4,423MW

Forecast error vs. horizon




Example: risk limiting dispatch

- ❑ **Structure:** intra-day multi stage energy purchase and sales
- ❑ **Information structure:** all observation prior to decision time
- ❑ **Criteria:** dynamic reliability and risk limits
- ❑ **Optimal policy:** Dual threshold: “buy-hold-sell”



Example: Risk Limiting Dispatch


% gain



Related references




- ❑ E. Bitar et. al., Bringing wind energy to market, IEEE TPS, to appear.
- ❑ R. Rajagopal, E. Bitar, P. Varaiya, F. Wu, "Risk limiting dispatch for integrating renewable power," Intl J. Elect. Power & Energy Systems, Jan 2013.

GridCloud: national scale grid monitoring



- ❑ **Goal:** cloud scale robust high performance monitoring infrastructure
- ❑ **Challenges:** CAP. Cyber security and privacy.
- ❑ **This project:**
 - Develop cloud infrastructure suitable for large scale monitoring and control.
 - Optimized tradeoffs

System testbed: SmartGridLab



Summary remarks: Not just a CPS

The grid is a Social Economic CPS!

CPS (circa 1950) → Economic (circa 1980) → Social (today!)

- ❑ **Uncertainties are fundamental.** Over provision may not be the right approach; imperfections and uncertainties must be part of the design.
- ❑ **Time is critical.** Deadline matters. Best effort may not be good enough.
- ❑ **Data (big, bad, malicious)** represent fundamental challenges for the future grid.