MIST: Systematic Analysis of Microarchitectural Information Leakage on Mobile Platforms

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Mobile Computing

- Mobile computing is everywhere:
  Smartphones, Wearables, IoTs, Set-top Boxes…
  - Multiple 3rd party apps run on the same platform, sharing the underlying hardware [1]
  - Privacy and security sensitive information stored and processed on devices; passwords, mobile banking, health data, e-mails, photos
- Sandboxing is required and enforced by the operating system; Android and iOS [2,3]
  - Compute power and battery life are biggest challenges; require heavy optimizations



Machine Learning for Profiling

- Applying Machine Learning techniques to classify cache patterns of different benchmark apps on the cloud
- Detecting ping requests via the Last Level Cache reveals and identifies co-located VMs
- SVM-based classifier is trained on many different apps:
- The success rate of classifying 40 different apps is 60% on Amazon EC2, using cross-validation



Mobile QoS Attack

- Degrade the performance of a victim app up to 90%
- Background service detects when the victim app is in use
- Uses combination of microarchitectural features and logical channel leakages
- Is stealthy: CPU load of the attacker does not exceed 10%
- Currently neither detected by Google Play Store nor the top malware scanners in the market





	Android Version	API Level	SoC	ARM Core	# of Cores	CPU Clock (GHz)	Big-Little?	32/64-bit?	ARM version
Galaxy S2	4.1.2	16	Exynos 4	Cortex-A9	2	1.2	no	32	v7-A
Nexus 5	5.1.1	22	Snapdragon 800	Krait 400	4	2.26	no	32	v7
Nexus 5X	6.0.1	23	Snapdragon 808	4x Cortex-A53 & 2x Cortex-A57	4+2	1.4 & 1.8	yes	64	v8-A
Galaxy S7 Edge	6.0.1	23	Snapdragon 820	4x Kryo	2+2	1.6 & 2.15	yes*	64	v8-A

Crypto Library Primitives

- Microarchitectural attacks exploit code design mistakes
- Security critical code should not feature secret dependent execution flow and memory accesses
- Creation of a methodology using cache traces and mutual information to validate the sanity of cryptographic code
- Evaluated the sanity of 8 well known cryptographic libraries (e.g WolfSSl, OpenSSl or Intel IPP) of AES, RSA and ECC
- The analysis shows that 50% of the implementations leak information
- Patches have been proposed and are currently being adopted





Future Work

- Reverse engineering of cache coherency protocols of various ARM processors
- Applying the ML techniques to recover sensitive information with low sample rate and high accuracy
- Investigate various mobile platforms like smartphones, wearables, set-top boxes and IoTs with ARM processors
- Software countermeasures to prevent the leakage of apps or to develop detection techniques using ML techniques

Bibliography

[1] Number of available applications in the Google Playstore from December 2009 to September 2016. https://www.statista.com/statistics/266210/number-of-available-applications-in-the-google-play-store
[2] iOS App Sandbox in Depth https://developer.apple.com/library/prerelease/content/documentation/Security/Conceptual/AppSandboxDesignGuide/AppSandboxInDepth/AppSandboxInDepth.html
[3] Android Security https://source.android.com/security/

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