

Now Do Voters Notice Review Screen Anomalies?



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Usability and Security

- Consider the amount of time and energy spent on voting system security, for example:
 - California's Top-to-Bottom review
 - Ohio's EVEREST review
 - Many other papers past and present EVT/WOTE
- This despite a lack of conclusive evidence that any major
 U.S. election has been stolen due to security flaws in DREs
 - Though of course this could have happened
- But we know major U.S. elections have turned on voting system usability



U.S. REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS 13TH CONGRESSIONAL DISTRICT (Vote for One)

	(Ante Lot. Olle)		
Vern Buchanan		REP	
Christine Jennings		DEM	
	STATE		
	GOVERNOR AND LIEUTENANT GOVERNOR (Vote for One)		
Charlie Crist Jeff Kottkamp		REP	
Jim Davis Daryl L. Jones		DEM	
Max Linn Tom Macklin		REF	
Richard Paul Dembinsky Dr. Joe Smith		NPA	
John Wayne Smith James J. Kearney		NPA	
Karl C.C. Behm Carol Castagnero		NPA	
Write-In			

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Usability and Security

- There are numerous other examples of this
 - See the 2008 Brennan Center report
- This is not to suggest that usability is more important than security
 - Though we'd argue that it does deserve equal time, which has not been the case
- Furthermore, usability and security are intertwined
 - The voter is the first line of defense against malfunctioning and/or malicious systems
 - Voters may be able to detect when things are not as they should be
 - The oft-given "check the review screen" advice



Usability and Review Screens

- Other usability findings from our previous work regarding DREs vs. older technologies
 - Voters are **not** more accurate voting with a DRE
 - Voters are **not** faster voting with a DRE
 - However, DREs are vastly preferred to older voting technologies
- But do voters actually check the review screen?
 - Or rather, how closely do they check?
 - Assumption has certainly been that voters do
- Everett (2007) research
 - Two experiments on review screen anomaly detection using the VoteBox DRE



STEP 1 Read Instructions

Review Choices

Below are the choices you have made. If you would like to make changes, click on the race you would like to change.

If you do not want to make changes, click the 'Next Page' button to go to Step 4.

Your vote will not be recorded unless you finish step 4.

STEP 2 Make your choices President: Vice President: Richard Rigby

Vernon Stanley Albur Judge on Court of Criminal Appeals:

District Attorney of Harris County:

Dan Plouffe

United States Senator:

US House of Representative :

None None

County Treasurer of Harris County: None

Govenor of Texas:

None

County Tax Assessor of Harris Country: None

None

None

Attorney General of Texas:

Lieutenant Governor of Texas:

Tim Speight

Cassie Principe

Justice of the Peace of Harris County:

None

Comptroller of Public Accounnts:

Greg Converse

County Judge of Harris Country: None

Commissioner of General Land Office:

Proposition 1:

Sheriff of Harris County:

Yes

Commissioner of Agriculture:

Railroad Commisioner of Texas:

State Representative of Texas:

Roberto Aron Jillian Balas

Sam Saddler

Proposition 2: Proposition 3:

Yes

Nο

State Senator of Texas:

None Proposition 4: Nο

None

State Board of Education:

Mark Baber

None

Proposition 6:

Proposition 5:

None

Presiding Judge on Texas Supreme Court: Tim Grasty

Click to go back to previous race

Click to go to Step 4: Record your vote

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STEP 3 Review your choices

STEP 4 Record your vote

Everett (2007)

- Results of two studies on anomaly detection
 - First study: 32% noticed the anomalies
 - Second study: 37% noticed the anomalies
- Also examined what other variables did and did not influence detection performance
- Affected detection performance:
 - Time spent on review screen
 - Whether or not voters were given a list of candidates
- Did not affect detection performance:
 - Number of anomalies
 - Location on the ballot of anomalies



Review Choices

Read Instructions

Below are the choices you have made. If you would like to make changes, click on the race you would like to change. Please be sure to review your choices and correct any mistakes *before* casting your ballot.

If you do not want to make changes, click the 'Next Page' button to go to Step 4.

Therese Gustin

Roberto Aron

Petra Bencomo

None

None

None

None

Your vote will not be recorded unless you finish step 4.

Make Your Choices

You are now on:

STEP 3 **Review Your Choices**

Important

STEP 4

Record Your Vote

President: Gordon Bearce Vice President: Nathan Maclean United States Senator:

Fern Brzezinski US House of Representative: Pedro Brouse

None Govenor of Texas: None Lieutenant Governor of Texas: Attorney General of Texas: None

Comptroller of Public Accounnts: Commissioner of General Land Office:

Commissioner of Agriculture : Railroad Commisioner of Texas:

State Senator of Texas:

State Board of Education:

State Representative of Texas:

Click to go back to previous contest

Judge on Court of Criminal Appeals:

District Attorney of Harris County: County Treasurer of Harris County:

Proposition 3:

Sheriff of Harris County: Stanley Saari None County Tax Assessor of Harris Country:

Justice of the Peace of Harris County: County Judge of Harris Country:

Proposition 1: Yes Proposition 2: Yes

None Proposition 4: Proposition 5:

Proposition 6: Nο

Click to go to Step 4: Record your vote

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Presiding Judge on Texas Supreme Court: None

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None

None

None

None

Yes

Dan Atchlev

Jennifer A.

Lundeed

D

R

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Results: Anomaly Detection

- 50% of voters detected the review screen anomalies
 - 95% confidence interval: 40.1% to 59.9%
 - Clear improvement beyond Everett (2007), but still less than ideal
- So, what drove anomaly detection?
 - Time spent on review screen (p = .003)
 - Anomaly type (p = .02)
 - Self-reported care in checking review screen (p = .04)
- Non-significant factors
 - Age, education, computer experience, news following, personality variables

How It All Got Started

- I have been doing interdisciplinary work since I was an undergraduate (dual major Psyc & Engineering)
 - Master's in Computer Science along with Psych Ph.D.
 - "Applied Cognitive Science" Most of my work is in computational modeling of human cognition for HF/HCI
- But I never thought about voting until:
 - I gave a talk at Rice in CS about the importance of usability
 - Dan Wallach (CS security type) called me because "even if we can engineer a voting system that's secure, if nobody can actually use it, that won't solve the problem"
- Joined ACCURATE and have been doing voting ever since

