SaTC 2019 PI meeting breakout group report summary: Trust and Security **Opportunities and Challenges in** Hardware Security Co-leads: Jim Plusquellic, Swaroop Ghosh, Rashmi Jha Room: Poplar, Hilton Mark Center, Alexandria,

### Problem/domain summary

- What is the topic?
  - Hardware Security
    - <u>System-level security</u>: Hardware-Software interface, cross-layer security, noninterference, Firmware, Subsequent layers, Lots of ways to attack
    - <u>Design</u>: Verifying trust in 3<sup>rd</sup> Party IP
    - <u>Supply chain</u>: Defending against counterfeiting
    - <u>Manufacturing</u>: Establishing trust
    - In-field System Security: side-channel attacks, detecting tamper
- Data-driven <u>Quantifiable Assurance</u>, Zero Trust
- <u>Deploy-ability</u>: PPACT ( Power, Performance, Area, Cost, Trust), practicality of solutions, *Triangle representation (efficiency vs. security vs. flexibility).*
- <u>Hardware support for Software Security</u>: Hardware security features that provide primitives for enhancing software security beyond TRNG.
- <u>Metric for Security:</u> Benchmarking at various layers.

# Problem/domain summary (Continued...)

- Why is it important to society? to a secure and trustworthy cyberspace? in other ways?
  - It impacts correctness, privacy, and safety
  - Unlike software, patching hardware is difficult
  - How can we build trusted systems with untrusted hardware?
    - Hardware is the root-of-trust, software security depends on trusted and secure hardware

## Problem/domain summary (Continued...)

- Is there is an existing body of research and/or practice? What are some highlights or pointers to it?
  - Each of the layers has some level of work done, cross layer integration is missing
  - Materials/Devices: Process Monitoring Structures, Reverse Engineering of layouts
  - Circuits: Embedded security primitives, PUFs, obfuscations, logic locking/encryption, TRNG
  - Architectures: Noise injection in communication channel, memory encryption, deterministic guarantees of latency, information-flow, non-interference
  - Hardware-software integration: Hardware and software open sources, TPM, DSA, security property propagation
  - Firmware: Elephant in the room, hardware-security community owns it, authenticating firmware updates, integral part of secure-boot process

### Key research challenges

- What are important challenges that remain? Are there new challenges that have arisen based on new models, new knowledge, new technologies, new uses, etc?
- Tools and metrics for measuring security and trust within and across layers is missing.
  - Whole idea of quantifying security is missing.
  - Support provided in EDA tools
  - Cross-layer verification capabilities: Verification complexity, tool efficiency
  - How to express and propagate the security/trust specifications in every layer?
    - Spectre Meltdown for example

## Key research challenges (Continued...)

- Lack of adversarial attack models and vulnerability evidence
  - Models for real-world critical exploits for hardware are not well-defined
    - Hardware honeypots? Educational value for students
  - Always ON vulnerability vs. sporadic triggering vulnerabilities.
  - Push for opensource architecture will provide opportunities for investigating vulnerabilities.
- Security-aware abstraction at various layers and CAD tool support
  - Obfuscation of logic and memory access patterns at architecture level
  - Non-interference in Microarchitecture
    - What data has to be non-interfering?
    - Addressing a regime of leakage.
    - Intra/Cross-layer support for security context-sensitive data

# Key research challenges (Continued...)

- Security in Specialized Architectures (Neuromorphic, Cryptographic, Quantum, Accelerators...)
- Hardening ASICs/FPGA technologies and architectures
- Materials/Devices:
  - Physical Assurance to detect and prevent tampering/fault injections.
  - Studying interplay between reliability, fault-tolerance, and security and trust.
  - E.g. Phase Change Memory (PCM): Encryption makes wear-out in PCM problem even worse. **Circuits:** 
    - Payloads (kill-switches, leakage, and beyond ), issue of trigger (not much reported on trigger)
    - fault-injection attacks
    - side channel, leakage
- *Hardware acceleration of post-quantum cryptography*

#### Potential approaches

- Are there promising directions to addressing them? What kinds of expertise and collaboration is needed (disciplines and subdisciplines)?
- Within/Across abstraction layer security and specification issues
  - Materials/Devices: Lack of security specifications
  - Circuits: Quantifying benefits vs. Cost, PPACT, security metrics.
  - Architectures: Cross-layer security, security metrics (within and cross-layer), benchmarks to test.
    - Classifying bits leaked based on rate and sensitivity
- FPGA: Moving target architectures, leveraging co-design as a security feature, managing the resources, re-defining architecture for multi-tenant
- New behavioral design language constructs for secure designs, HLS support
- New analog design methodologies

### Long-term significance

- Will this domain/problem remain relevant in 10 years? if so, why?
  - Will become more important in 10 years
  - Societal dependence on autonomy: Hardware has to make decisions in real-time with no down-time
    - Big driver for security in future
    - Trust and Reputation management
    - Edge computing in untrusted fields
  - Post CMOS devices, 3D ICs, Quantum : Attack models are undefined and untested.
  - Security Automation throughout the design process.
    - Design Aids for security.
    - Evolving security metric beyond PPA.
  - Incorporation of security into Undergraduate education