Visible to the public EAGER: Cybermanufacturing: Defending Side Channel Attacks in Cyber-Physical Additive Layer Manufacturing SystemsConflict Detection Enabled

Project Details
Lead PI:Mohammad Abdullah Al Faruque
Performance Period:10/01/15 - 09/30/17
Institution(s):University of California, Irvine
Sponsor(s):National Science Foundation
Project URL:http://aicps.eng.uci.edu/research.htm
Award Number:1546993
603 Reads. Placed 203 out of 803 NSF CPS Projects based on total reads on all related artifacts.
Abstract: Cyber-physical additive layer manufacturing, e.g., 3D printing, has become a promising technology for providing cost, time, and space effective solution by reducing the gap between designers and manufacturers. However, the concern for the protection of intellectual property is arising in conjunction with the capabilities of supporting massive innovative designs and rapid prototyping. Intellectual property in the additive layer manufacturing system consists of: i) geometric design of an object; ii) attributes of an object; iii) process information; and iv) machine information. This Early-concept Grant for Exploratory Research (EAGER) project seeks to develop defense mechanisms for detecting malware and counterfeit articles using a variety of signals that are observed during the manufacturing process including acoustic, temperature, power, and others. The project is an EAGER because both the uniqueness of the observed signal signatures, and their utilization in securing the manufacturing process are high risk with potential for high reward in thwarting attacks. This project will demonstrate that during the life-cycle of the additive layer manufacturing system, the intellectual property information contained in the cyber domain can be recovered/reconstructed through attacks occurring during the manufacturing process in the physical domain through various non-intrusive techniques. It will then focus on creating both machine-dependent and machine-independent defense mechanisms for avoiding such an attack. This project will significantly impact US competitiveness over technology-oriented manufacturing. The attack model will provide feedback to 3D printer manufacturers and CAD tool designers to build defenses against these new types of attack. Moreover, it will have a significant societal impact to the explosively growing maker and crowd-sourcing community in protecting their intellectual property. In addition, the project's approach can be used in other manufacturing systems, e.g., CNC machines, manufacturing robots, etc. This is possibly the very first approach to create defense for additive layer manufacturing mechanisms against such attacks occurring in the physical domain to get access to information of the cyber domain. This project has three specific objectives: 1) It will demonstrate a proof of concept by presenting a novel attack model constructed using a combination of machine learning, signal processing, and pattern recognition techniques that utilize the side-channel information (power, temperature, acoustic, electromagnetic emission) obtained during the manufacturing process. 2) It will develop a machine-specific defense mechanism against the attack model for the 3D printer. New techniques to add additional physical process encryption, e.g. adding extra information to the G-code to obfuscate the printing process from the attack model between the G-code and the physical manufacturing process, will be demonstrated. 3) It will create a new security-aware 3D-printing algorithm for the machine-independent CAD tools that can protect against such side channel attacks. The 3D-printing algorithm will slice the STL and generate layer description language (e.g. G-code) randomly so that for the same 3D object, different instructions will be sent to the 3D printer and eventually different physical features will be extracted by the attackers.