Biblio

Filters: Keyword is decision makers  [Clear All Filters]
2019-03-04
Herald, N. E., David, M. W..  2018.  A Framework for Making Effective Responses to Cyberattacks. 2018 IEEE International Conference on Big Data (Big Data). :4798–4805.
The process for determining how to respond to a cyberattack involves evaluating many factors, including some with competing risks. Consequentially, decision makers in the private sector and policymakers in the U.S. government (USG) need a framework in order to make effective response decisions. The authors' research identified two competing risks: 1) the risk of not responding forcefully enough to deter a suspected attacker, and 2) responding in a manner that escalates a situation with an attacker. The authors also identified three primary factors that influence these risks: attribution confidence/time, the scale of the attack, and the relationship with the suspected attacker. This paper provides a framework to help decision makers understand how these factors interact to influence the risks associated with potential response options to cyberattacks. The views expressed do not reflect the official policy or position of the National Intelligence University, the Department of Defense, the U.S. Intelligence Community, or the U.S. Government.
2018-05-15
2015-05-05
Kornmaier, A., Jaouen, F..  2014.  Beyond technical data - a more comprehensive situational awareness fed by available intelligence information. Cyber Conflict (CyCon 2014), 2014 6th International Conference On. :139-154.

Information on cyber incidents and threats are currently collected and processed with a strong technical focus. Threat and vulnerability information alone are not a solid base for effective, affordable or actionable security advice for decision makers. They need more than a small technical cut of a bigger situational picture to combat and not only to mitigate the cyber threat. We first give a short overview over the related work that can be found in the literature. We found that the approaches mostly analysed “what” has been done, instead of looking more generically beyond the technical aspects for the tactics, techniques and procedures to identify the “how” it was done, by whom and why. We examine then, what information categories and data already exist to answer the question for an adversary's capabilities and objectives. As traditional intelligence tries to serve a better understanding of adversaries' capabilities, actions, and intent, the same is feasible in the cyber space with cyber intelligence. Thus, we identify information sources in the military and civil environment, before we propose to link that traditional information with the technical data for a better situational picture. We give examples of information that can be collected from traditional intelligence for correlation with technical data. Thus, the same intelligence operational picture for the cyber sphere could be developed like the one that is traditionally fed from conventional intelligence disciplines. Finally we propose a way of including intelligence processing in cyber analysis. We finally outline requirements that are key for a successful exchange of information and intelligence between military/civil information providers.