Visible to the public Biblio

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Rui Shu, Xiaohui Gu, William Enck.  2017.  A Study of Security Vulnerabilities on Docker Hub. Proceedings of the ACM Conference on Data and Application Security and Privacy (CODASPY).
Rui Shu, Xiaohui Gu, William Enck.  2017.  A Study of Security Vulnerabilities on Docker Hub. Proceedings of the ACM Conference on Data and Application Security and Privacy (CODASPY).

Docker containers have recently become a popular approach to provision multiple applications over shared physical hosts in a more lightweight fashion than traditional virtual machines. This popularity has led to the creation of the Docker Hub registry, which distributes a large number of official and community images. In this paper, we study the state of security vulnerabilities in Docker Hub images. We create a scalable Docker image vulnerability analysis (DIVA) framework that automatically discovers, downloads, and analyzes both official and community images on Docker Hub. Using our framework, we have studied 356,218 images and made the following findings: (1) both official and community images contain more than 180 vulnerabilities on average when considering all versions; (2) many images have not been updated for hundreds of days; and (3) vulnerabilities commonly propagate from parent images to child images. These findings demonstrate a strong need for more automated and systematic methods of applying security updates to Docker images and our current Docker image analysis framework provides a good foundation for such automatic security update.

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Adwait Nadkarni, Benjamin Andow, William Enck, Somesh Jha.  2016.  Practical DIFC Enforcement on Android. USENIX Security Symposium.

Smartphone users often use private and enterprise data with untrusted third party applications.  The fundamental lack of secrecy guarantees in smartphone OSes, such as Android, exposes this data to the risk of unauthorized exfiltration.  A natural solution is the integration of secrecy guarantees into the OS.  In this paper, we describe the challenges for decentralized information flow control (DIFC) enforcement on Android.  We propose context-sensitive DIFC enforcement via lazy polyinstantiation and practical and secure network export through domain declassification.  Our DIFC system, Weir, is backwards compatible by design, and incurs less than 4 ms overhead for component startup.  With Weir,  we demonstrate practical and secure DIFC enforcement on Android.