Visible to the public SOCCA: A Security-Oriented Cyber-Physical Contingency Analysis in Power Infrastructures

TitleSOCCA: A Security-Oriented Cyber-Physical Contingency Analysis in Power Infrastructures
Publication TypeJournal Article
Year of Publication2014
AuthorsZonouz, S., Davis, C.M., Davis, K.R., Berthier, R., Bobba, R.B., Sanders, W.H.
JournalSmart Grid, IEEE Transactions on
Date PublishedJan
Keywordsaccidental contingency, Algorithm design and analysis, contingency analysis, control network, cyber components, cyber network configuration, cyber perspective, cyber-physical security evaluation, Cyber-physical systems, grid operation, Indexes, malicious compromises, Mathematical model, Network topology, physical components, power grids, power infrastructures, power system contingency, power system planning, power system security, power system topology, security, security-oriented cyber-physical contingency analysis, situational awareness, SOCCA, state estimation

Contingency analysis is a critical activity in the context of the power infrastructure because it provides a guide for resiliency and enables the grid to continue operating even in the case of failure. In this paper, we augment this concept by introducing SOCCA, a cyber-physical security evaluation technique to plan not only for accidental contingencies but also for malicious compromises. SOCCA presents a new unified formalism to model the cyber-physical system including interconnections among cyber and physical components. The cyber-physical contingency ranking technique employed by SOCCA assesses the potential impacts of events. Contingencies are ranked according to their impact as well as attack complexity. The results are valuable in both cyber and physical domains. From a physical perspective, SOCCA scores power system contingencies based on cyber network configuration, whereas from a cyber perspective, control network vulnerabilities are ranked according to the underlying power system topology.

Citation Key6687271