Visible to the public Resilience Analysis of Power Grids Under the Sequential Attack

TitleResilience Analysis of Power Grids Under the Sequential Attack
Publication TypeJournal Article
Year of Publication2014
AuthorsYihai Zhu, Jun Yan, Yufei Tang, Sun, Y.L., Haibo He
JournalInformation Forensics and Security, IEEE Transactions on
Date PublishedDec
KeywordsAttack Strategies, Cascading Failures, catastrophic consequences, complexity analysis, Complexity theory, electrical service, Power Grid Security, power grids, power grids vulnerability, Power system protection, power system security, power transmission lines, power transmission reliability, resilience analysis, sequential attack, sequential attack graph, substation-transmission lines, Substations

The modern society increasingly relies on electrical service, which also brings risks of catastrophic consequences, e.g., large-scale blackouts. In the current literature, researchers reveal the vulnerability of power grids under the assumption that substations/transmission lines are removed or attacked synchronously. In reality, however, it is highly possible that such removals can be conducted sequentially. Motivated by this idea, we discover a new attack scenario, called the sequential attack, which assumes that substations/transmission lines can be removed sequentially, not synchronously. In particular, we find that the sequential attack can discover many combinations of substation whose failures can cause large blackout size. Previously, these combinations are ignored by the synchronous attack. In addition, we propose a new metric, called the sequential attack graph (SAG), and a practical attack strategy based on SAG. In simulations, we adopt three test benchmarks and five comparison schemes. Referring to simulation results and complexity analysis, we find that the proposed scheme has strong performance and low complexity.

Citation Key6926763