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Symington, Andrew, Medvesek, Jan, Martin, Paul, Srivastava, Mani, Hailes, Stephen.  2015.  Real-time Indoor Localization using Magnetic, Time of Flight, and Signal Strength Inference Maps. Indoor Location Competition at the ACM/IEEE Information Processing in Sensor Networks (IPSN).
Sunkara, Vishwamithra, Ye, Zhihang, Chakravarthy, Animesh, Chen, Zheng.  2016.  Collision avoidance by IPMC actuated robotic fish using the Collision Cone Approach. Simulation, Modeling, and Programming for Autonomous Robots (SIMPAR), IEEE International Conference on. :238–245.
Subhojeet Mukherjee, Jacob Walker, Indrakshi Ray, Jeremy Daily.  2017.  A Precedence Graph-Based Approach to Detect Message Injection Attacks in J1939 Based Networks. Privacy, Security, and Trust - 12th International Conference, {PST} 2017, Calgary, Canada, August 28-30, 2017, Proceedings.
Subhojeet Mukherjee, Noah Cain, Jacob Walker, David White, Indrajit Ray, Indrakshi Ray.  2017.  POSTER: PenJ1939: An Interactive Framework for Design and Dissemination of Exploits for Commercial Vehicles. Proceedings of the 2017 {ACM} {SIGSAC} Conference on Computer and Communications Security, {CCS} 2017, Dallas, TX, USA, October 30 - November 03, 2017. :2559–2561.
Subhojeet Mukherjee, Hossein Shirazi, Indrakshi Ray, Jeremy Daily, Rose Gamble.  2016.  Practical DoS Attacks on Embedded Networks in Commercial Vehicles. Information Systems Security. 10063:23-42.

The Controller Area Network (CAN) protocol has become the primary choice for in-vehicle communications for passenger cars and commercial vehicles. However, it is possible for malicious adversaries to cause major damage by exploiting flaws in the CAN protocol design or implementation. Researchers have shown that an attacker can remotely inject malicious messages into the CAN network in order to disrupt or alter normal vehicle behavior. Some of these attacks can lead to catastrophic consequences for both the vehicle and the driver. Although there are several defense techniques against CAN based attacks, attack surfaces like physically and remotely controllable Electronic Control Units (ECUs) can be used to launch attacks on protocols running on top of the CAN network, such as the SAE J1939 protocol. Commercial vehicles adhere to the SAE J1939 standards that make use of the CAN protocol for physical communication and that are modeled in a manner similar to that of the ISO/OSI 7 layer protocol stack. We posit that the J1939 standards can be subjected to attacks similar to those that have been launched successfully on the OSI layer protocols. Towards this end, we demonstrate how such attacks can be performed on a test-bed having 3 J1939 speaking ECUs connected via a single high-speed CAN bus. Our main goal is to show that the regular operations performed by the J1939 speaking ECUs can be disrupted by manipulating the packet exchange protocols and specifications made by J1939 data-link layer standards. The list of attacks documented in this paper is not comprehensive but given the homogeneous and ubiquitous usage of J1939 standards in commercial vehicles we believe these attacks, along with newer attacks introduced in the future, can cause widespread damage in the heavy vehicle industry, if not mitigated pro-actively.

Stern, R., Work, D., Cui, S., Pohlmann, H., Seibold, B., Delle Monache, M. L., Piccoli, B., Sprinkle, J..  2016.  Stabilizing traffic with a single autonomous vehicle: WiP abstract. Proceedings of the 7th International Conference on Cyber-Physical Systems. :9.
Stephanedes, Yorgos, Hourdakis, John.  1996.  Transferability of freeway incident detection algorithms. Transportation Research Record: Journal of the Transportation Research Board. :184–195.
Stavros Tripakis.  2016.  Compositionality in the Science of System Design. Proceedings of the {IEEE}. 104:960–972.
Stavros Tripakis.  2016.  Compositional Model-Based System Design and Other Foundations for Mastering Change. T. Foundations for Mastering Change. 1:113–129.
Stavros Tripakis, Rhishikesh Limaye, Kaushik Ravindran, Guoqiang Wang.  2014.  On tokens and signals: Bridging the semantic gap between dataflow models and hardware implementations. XIVth International Conference on Embedded Computer Systems: Architectures, Modeling, and Simulation, {SAMOS} 2014, Agios Konstantinos, Samos, Greece, July 14-17, 2014. :51–58.
Stavros Tripakis, Chris Shaver.  2014.  Feedback in Synchronous Relational Interfaces. From Programs to Systems. The Systems perspective in Computing - {ETAPS} Workshop, {FPS} 2014, in Honor of Joseph Sifakis, Grenoble, France, April 6, 2014. Proceedings. :249–266.
Stavros Tripakis.  2015.  Bridging the semantic gap between heterogeneous modeling formalisms and FMI. 2015 International Conference on Embedded Computer Systems: Architectures, Modeling, and Simulation, {SAMOS} 2015, Samos, Greece, July 19-23, 2015. :60–69.
Stanley Bak, Parasara Sridhar Duggirala.  2017.  Simulation-Equivalent Reachability of Large Linear Systems with Inputs. Computer Aided Verification - 29th International Conference, {CAV} 2017, Heidelberg, Germany, July 24-28, 2017, Proceedings, Part {I}. :401–420.
Stanley Bak, Parasara Sridhar Duggirala.  2017.  Rigorous Simulation-Based Analysis of Linear Hybrid Systems. Tools and Algorithms for the Construction and Analysis of Systems - 23rd International Conference, {TACAS} 2017, Held as Part of the European Joint Conferences on Theory and Practice of Software, {ETAPS} 2017, Uppsala, Sweden, April 22-29, 2017, Proceedin. :555–572.
Stanley Bak, Parasara Sridhar Duggirala.  2017.  HyLAA: A Tool for Computing Simulation-Equivalent Reachability for Linear Systems. Proceedings of the 20th International Conference on Hybrid Systems: Computation and Control, {HSCC} 2017, Pittsburgh, PA, USA, April 18-20, 2017. :173–178.