Visible to the public Deceptive Routing in Relay NetworksConflict Detection Enabled

TitleDeceptive Routing in Relay Networks
Publication TypeConference Paper
Year of Publication2012
AuthorsAndrew Clark, University of Washington, Quanyan Zhu, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, Radha Poovendran, University of Washington, Tamer Başar, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign
Conference NameConference on Decision and Game Theory for Security
Date Published11/2012
Conference LocationBudapest, Hungary
Keywordsgame theory, jamming and security, NSA SoS Lablets Materials, relay networks, routing algorithms, science of security, Stackelberg Equilibrium, Toward a Theory of Resilience in Systems: A Game-Theoretic Approach, UIUC
Abstract

Physical-layer and MAC-layer defense mechanisms against jamming attacks are often inherently reactive to experienced delay and loss of throughput after being attacked. In this paper, we study a proactive defense mechanism against jamming in multi-hop relay networks, in which one or more network sources introduce a deceptive network flow along a disjoint routing path. The deceptive mechanism leverages strategic jamming behaviors, causing the attacker to expend resources on targeting deceptive flows and thereby reducing the impact on real network trac. We use a two-stage game model to obtain deception strategies at Stackelberg equilibrium for sel sh and altruistic nodes. The equilibrium solutions are illustrated and corroborated through a simulation study.

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Deceptive Routing Games