Visible to the public DARPA: Device Attestation Resilient to Physical Attacks

TitleDARPA: Device Attestation Resilient to Physical Attacks
Publication TypeConference Paper
Year of Publication2016
AuthorsIbrahim, Ahmad, Sadeghi, Ahmad-Reza, Tsudik, Gene, Zeitouni, Shaza
Conference NameProceedings of the 9th ACM Conference on Security & Privacy in Wireless and Mobile Networks
Conference LocationNew York, NY, USA
ISBN Number978-1-4503-4270-4
Keywordsattestation, capture, collective attestation, embedded devices, Metrics, networks, Neural Network, Neural networks, neural networks security, physical attacks, policy-based governance, pubcrawl, Resiliency

As embedded devices (under the guise of "smart-whatever") rapidly proliferate into many domains, they become attractive targets for malware. Protecting them from software and physical attacks becomes both important and challenging. Remote attestation is a basic tool for mitigating such attacks. It allows a trusted party (verifier) to remotely assess software integrity of a remote, untrusted, and possibly compromised, embedded device (prover). Prior remote attestation methods focus on software (malware) attacks in a one-verifier/one-prover setting. Physical attacks on provers are generally ruled out as being either unrealistic or impossible to mitigate. In this paper, we argue that physical attacks must be considered, particularly, in the context of many provers, e.g., a network, of devices. As- suming that physical attacks require capture and subsequent temporary disablement of the victim device(s), we propose DARPA, a light-weight protocol that takes advantage of absence detection to identify suspected devices. DARPA is resilient against a very strong adversary and imposes minimal additional hardware requirements. We justify and identify DARPA's design goals and evaluate its security and costs.

Citation Keyibrahim_darpa:_2016