Visible to the public DCSP: Performant Certificate Revocation a DNS-based Approach

TitleDCSP: Performant Certificate Revocation a DNS-based Approach
Publication TypeConference Paper
Year of Publication2016
AuthorsChariton, Antonios A., Degkleri, Eirini, Papadopoulos, Panagiotis, Ilia, Panagiotis, Markatos, Evangelos P.
Conference NameProceedings of the 9th European Workshop on System Security
Conference LocationNew York, NY, USA
ISBN Number978-1-4503-4295-7
KeywordsHuman Behavior, Metrics, pubcrawl, Resiliency, scalabilty, SSL Trust Models

Trust in SSL-based communication on the Internet is provided by Certificate Authorities (CAs) in the form of signed certificates. Checking the validity of a certificate involves three steps: (i) checking its expiration date, (ii) verifying its signature, and (iii) making sure that it is not revoked. Currently, Certificate Revocation checks (i.e. step (iii) above) are done either via Certificate Revocation Lists (CRLs) or Online Certificate Status Protocol (OCSP) servers. Unfortunately, both current approaches tend to incur such a high overhead that several browsers (including almost all mobile ones) choose not to check certificate revocation status, thereby exposing their users to significant security risks. To address this issue, we propose DCSP: a new low-latency approach that provides up-to-date and accurate certificate revocation information. DCSP capitalizes on the existing scalable and high-performance infrastructure of DNS. DCSP minimizes end user latency while, at the same time, requiring only a small number of cryptographic signatures by the CAs. Our design and initial performance results show that DCSP has the potential to perform an order of magnitude faster than the current state-of-the-art alternatives.

Citation Keychariton_dcsp:_2016