Visible to the public POSTER: Inaudible Voice Commands

TitlePOSTER: Inaudible Voice Commands
Publication TypeConference Paper
Year of Publication2017
AuthorsSong, Liwei, Mittal, Prateek
Conference NameProceedings of the 2017 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security
Conference LocationNew York, NY, USA
ISBN Number978-1-4503-4946-8
Keywordscommand injection attacks, composability, inaudible ultrasound injection, intermodulation distortion, Metrics, microphone, non-linearity, pubcrawl, resilience, Resiliency

Voice assistants like Siri enable us to control IoT devices conveniently with voice commands, however, they also provide new attack opportunities for adversaries. Previous papers attack voice assistants with obfuscated voice commands by leveraging the gap between speech recognition system and human voice perception. The limitation is that these obfuscated commands are audible and thus conspicuous to device owners. In this poster, we propose a novel mechanism to directly attack the microphone used for sensing voice data with inaudible voice commands. We show that the adversary can exploit the microphone's non-linearity and play well-designed inaudible ultrasounds to cause the microphone to record normal voice commands, and thus control the victim device inconspicuously. We demonstrate via end-to-end real-world experiments that our inaudible voice commands can attack an Android phone and an Amazon Echo device with high success rates at a range of 2-3 meters.

Citation Keysong_poster:_2017