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C
Konstantinou, Charalambos, Maniatakos, Michail.  2016.  A Case Study on Implementing False Data Injection Attacks Against Nonlinear State Estimation. Proceedings of the 2Nd ACM Workshop on Cyber-Physical Systems Security and Privacy. :81–92.

Smart grid aims to improve control and monitoring routines to ensure reliable and efficient supply of electricity. The rapid advancements in information and communication technologies of Supervisory Control And Data Acquisition (SCADA) networks, however, have resulted in complex cyber physical systems. This added complexity has broadened the attack surface of power-related applications, amplifying their susceptibility to cyber threats. A particular class of system integrity attacks against the smart grid is False Data Injection (FDI). In a successful FDI attack, an adversary compromises the readings of grid sensors in such a way that errors introduced into estimates of state variables remain undetected. This paper presents an end-to-end case study of how to instantiate real FDI attacks to the Alternating Current (AC) –nonlinear– State Estimation (SE) process. The attack is realized through firmware modifications of the microprocessor-based remote terminal systems, falsifying the data transmitted to the SE routine, and proceeds regardless of perfect or imperfect knowledge of the current system state. The case study concludes with an investigation of an attack on the IEEE 14 bus system using load data from the New York Independent System Operator (NYISO).

M
Anubi, Olugbenga Moses, Konstantinou, Charalambos, Wong, Carlos A., Vedula, Satish.  2020.  Multi-Model Resilient Observer under False Data Injection Attacks. 2020 IEEE Conference on Control Technology and Applications (CCTA). :1–8.

In this paper, we present the concept of boosting the resiliency of optimization-based observers for cyber-physical systems (CPS) using auxiliary sources of information. Due to the tight coupling of physics, communication and computation, a malicious agent can exploit multiple inherent vulnerabilities in order to inject stealthy signals into the measurement process. The problem setting considers the scenario in which an attacker strategically corrupts portions of the data in order to force wrong state estimates which could have catastrophic consequences. The goal of the proposed observer is to compute the true states in-spite of the adversarial corruption. In the formulation, we use a measurement prior distribution generated by the auxiliary model to refine the feasible region of a traditional compressive sensing-based regression problem. A constrained optimization-based observer is developed using l1-minimization scheme. Numerical experiments show that the solution of the resulting problem recovers the true states of the system. The developed algorithm is evaluated through a numerical simulation example of the IEEE 14-bus system.