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Susilo, Willy, Chen, Rongmao, Guo, Fuchun, Yang, Guomin, Mu, Yi, Chow, Yang-Wai.  2016.  Recipient Revocable Identity-Based Broadcast Encryption: How to Revoke Some Recipients in IBBE Without Knowledge of the Plaintext. Proceedings of the 11th ACM on Asia Conference on Computer and Communications Security. :201–210.
In this paper, we present the notion of recipient-revocable identity-based broadcast encryption scheme. In this notion, a content provider will produce encrypted content and send them to a third party (which is a broadcaster). This third party will be able to revoke some identities from the ciphertext. We present a security model to capture these requirements, as well as a concrete construction. The ciphertext consists of k+3 group elements, assuming that the maximum number of revocation identities is k. That is, the ciphertext size is linear in the maximal size of R, where R is the revocation identity set. However, we say that the additional elements compared to that from an IBBE scheme are only for the revocation but not for decryption. Therefore, the ciphertext sent to the users for decryption will be of constant size (i.e.,3 group elements). Finally, we present the proof of security of our construction.
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Xia, Yusheng, Chen, Rongmao, Su, Jinshu, Pan, Chen, Su, Han.  2020.  Hybrid Routing: Towards Resilient Routing in Anonymous Communication Networks. ICC 2020 - 2020 IEEE International Conference on Communications (ICC). :1—7.

Anonymous communication networks (ACNs) are intended to protect the metadata during communication. As classic ACNs, onion mix-nets are famous for strong anonymity, in which the source defines a static path and wraps the message multi-times with the public keys of nodes on the path, through which the message is relayed to the destination. However, onion mix-nets lacks in resilience when the static on-path mixes fail. Mix failure easily results in message loss, communication failure, and even specific attacks. Therefore, it is desirable to achieve resilient routing in onion mix-nets, providing persistent routing capability even though node failure. The state-of-theart solutions mainly adopt mix groups and thus need to share secret keys among all the group members which may cause single point of failure. To address this problem, in this work we propose a hybrid routing approach, which embeds the onion mix-net with hop-by-hop routing to increase routing resilience. Furthermore, we propose the threshold hybrid routing to achieve better key management and avoid single point of failure. As for experimental evaluations, we conduct quantitative analysis of the resilience and realize a local T-hybrid routing prototype to test performance. The experimental results show that our proposed routing strategy increases routing resilience effectively, at the expense of acceptable latency.