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Aublin, Pierre-Louis, Kelbert, Florian, O'Keeffe, Dan, Muthukumaran, Divya, Priebe, Christian, Lind, Joshua, Krahn, Robert, Fetzer, Christof, Eyers, David, Pietzuch, Peter.  2018.  LibSEAL: Revealing Service Integrity Violations Using Trusted Execution. Proceedings of the Thirteenth EuroSys Conference. :24:1–24:15.
Users of online services such as messaging, code hosting and collaborative document editing expect the services to uphold the integrity of their data. Despite providers' best efforts, data corruption still occurs, but at present service integrity violations are excluded from SLAs. For providers to include such violations as part of SLAs, the competing requirements of clients and providers must be satisfied. Clients need the ability to independently identify and prove service integrity violations to claim compensation. At the same time, providers must be able to refute spurious claims. We describe LibSEAL, a SEcure Audit Library for Internet services that creates a non-repudiable audit log of service operations and checks invariants to discover violations of service integrity. LibSEAL is a drop-in replacement for TLS libraries used by services, and thus observes and logs all service requests and responses. It runs inside a trusted execution environment, such as Intel SGX, to protect the integrity of the audit log. Logs are stored using an embedded relational database, permitting service invariant violations to be discovered using simple SQL queries. We evaluate LibSEAL with three popular online services (Git, ownCloud and Dropbox) and demonstrate that it is effective in discovering integrity violations, while reducing throughput by at most 14%.
Goltzsche, David, Wulf, Colin, Muthukumaran, Divya, Rieck, Konrad, Pietzuch, Peter, Kapitza, Rüdiger.  2017.  TrustJS: Trusted Client-Side Execution of JavaScript. Proceedings of the 10th European Workshop on Systems Security. :7:1–7:6.

Client-side JavaScript has become ubiquitous in web applications to improve user experience and reduce server load. However, since clients are untrusted, servers cannot rely on the confidentiality or integrity of client-side JavaScript code and the data that it operates on. For example, client-side input validation must be repeated at server side, and confidential business logic cannot be offloaded. In this paper, we present TrustJS, a framework that enables trustworthy execution of security-sensitive JavaScript inside commodity browsers. TrustJS leverages trusted hardware support provided by Intel SGX to protect the client-side execution of JavaScript, enabling a flexible partitioning of web application code. We present the design of TrustJS and provide initial evaluation results, showing that trustworthy JavaScript offloading can further improve user experience and conserve more server resources.

Papagiannis, Ioannis, Watcharapichat, Pijika, Muthukumaran, Divya, Pietzuch, Peter.  2016.  BrowserFlow: Imprecise Data Flow Tracking to Prevent Accidental Data Disclosure. Proceedings of the 17th International Middleware Conference. :9:1–9:13.

With the use of external cloud services such as Google Docs or Evernote in an enterprise setting, the loss of control over sensitive data becomes a major concern for organisations. It is typical for regular users to violate data disclosure policies accidentally, e.g. when sharing text between documents in browser tabs. Our goal is to help such users comply with data disclosure policies: we want to alert them about potentially unauthorised data disclosure from trusted to untrusted cloud services. This is particularly challenging when users can modify data in arbitrary ways, they employ multiple cloud services, and cloud services cannot be changed. To track the propagation of text data robustly across cloud services, we introduce imprecise data flow tracking, which identifies data flows implicitly by detecting and quantifying the similarity between text fragments. To reason about violations of data disclosure policies, we describe a new text disclosure model that, based on similarity, associates text fragments in web browsers with security tags and identifies unauthorised data flows to untrusted services. We demonstrate the applicability of imprecise data tracking through BrowserFlow, a browser-based middleware that alerts users when they expose potentially sensitive text to an untrusted cloud service. Our experiments show that BrowserFlow can robustly track data flows and manage security tags for documents with no noticeable performance impact.