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Li, T., Ma, J., Pei, Q., Song, H., Shen, Y., Sun, C..  2019.  DAPV: Diagnosing Anomalies in MANETs Routing With Provenance and Verification. IEEE Access. 7:35302–35316.
Routing security plays an important role in the mobile ad hoc networks (MANETs). Despite many attempts to improve its security, the routing mechanism of MANETs remains vulnerable to attacks. Unlike most existing solutions that prevent the specific problems, our approach tends to detect the misbehavior and identify the anomalous nodes in MANETs automatically. The existing approaches offer support for detecting attacks or debugging in different routing phases, but many of them cannot answer the absence of an event. Besides, without considering the privacy of the nodes, these methods depend on the central control program or a third party to supervise the whole network. In this paper, we present a system called DAPV that can find single or collaborative malicious nodes and the paralyzed nodes which behave abnormally. DAPV can detect both direct and indirect attacks launched during the routing phase. To detect malicious or abnormal nodes, DAPV relies on two main techniques. First, the provenance tracking enables the hosts to deduce the expected log information of the peers with the known log entries. Second, the privacy-preserving verification uses Merkle Hash Tree to verify the logs without revealing any privacy of the nodes. We demonstrate the effectiveness of our approach by applying DAPV to three scenarios: 1) detecting injected malicious intermediated routers which commit active and passive attacks in MANETs; 2) resisting the collaborative black-hole attack of the AODV protocol, and; 3) detecting paralyzed routers in university campus networks. Our experimental results show that our approach can detect the malicious and paralyzed nodes, and the overhead of DAPV is moderate.
E
Sun, C., Xi, N., Ma, J..  2017.  Enforcing Generalized Refinement-Based Noninterference for Secure Interface Composition. 2017 IEEE 41st Annual Computer Software and Applications Conference (COMPSAC). 1:586–595.

Information flow security has been considered as a critical requirement on complicated component-based software. The recent efforts on the compositional information flow analyses were limited on the expressiveness of security lattice and the efficiency of compositional enforcement. Extending these approaches to support more general security lattices is usually nontrivial because the compositionality of information flow security properties should be properly treated. In this work, we present a new extension of interface automaton. On this interface structure, we propose two refinement-based security properties, adaptable to any finite security lattice. For each property, we present and prove the security condition that ensures the property to be preserved under composition. Furthermore, we implement the refinement algorithms and the security condition decision procedure. We demonstrate the usability and efficiency of our approach with in-depth case studies. The evaluation results show that our compositional enforcement can effectively reduce the verification cost compared with global verification on composite system.

L
Li, T., Ma, J., Pei, Q., Shen, Y., Sun, C..  2018.  Log-based Anomalies Detection of MANETs Routing with Reasoning and Verification. 2018 Asia-Pacific Signal and Information Processing Association Annual Summit and Conference (APSIPA ASC). :240–246.

Routing security plays an important role in Mobile Ad hoc Networks (MANETs). Despite many attempts to improve its security, the routing procedure of MANETs remains vulnerable to attacks. Existing approaches offer support for detecting attacks or debugging in different routing phases, but many of them have not considered the privacy of the nodes during the anomalies detection, which depend on the central control program or a third party to supervise the whole network. In this paper, we present an approach called LAD which uses the raw logs of routers to construct control a flow graph and find the existing communication rules in MANETs. With the reasoning rules, LAD can detect both active and passive attacks launched during the routing phase. LAD can also protect the privacy of the nodes in the verification phase with the specific Merkle hash tree. Without deploying any special nodes to assist the verification, LAD can detect multiple malicious nodes by itself. To show that our approach can be used to guarantee the security of the MANETs, we deploy our experiment in NS3 as well as the practical router environment. LAD can improve the accuracy rate from 2.28% to 29.22%. The results show that LAD performs limited time and memory usages, high detection and low false positives.

P
Li, T., Ma, J., Sun, C., Wei, D., Xi, N..  2017.  PVad: Privacy-Preserving Verification for Secure Routing in Ad Hoc Networks. 2017 International Conference on Networking and Network Applications (NaNA). :5–10.

Routing security has a great importance to the security of Mobile Ad Hoc Networks (MANETs). There are various kinds of attacks when establishing routing path between source and destination. The adversaries attempt to deceive the source node and get the privilege of data transmission. Then they try to launch the malicious behaviors such as passive or active attacks. Due to the characteristics of the MANETs, e.g. dynamic topology, open medium, distributed cooperation, and constrained capability, it is difficult to verify the behavior of nodes and detect malicious nodes without revealing any privacy. In this paper, we present PVad, an approach conducting privacy-preserving verification in the routing discovery phase of MANETs. PVad tries to find the existing communication rules by association rules instead of making the rules. PVad consists of two phases, a reasoning phase deducing the expected log data of the peers, and a verification phase using Merkle Hash Tree to verify the correctness of derived information without revealing any privacy of nodes on expected routing paths. Without deploying any special nodes to assist the verification, PVad can detect multiple malicious nodes by itself. To show our approach can be used to guarantee the security of the MANETs, we conduct our experiments in NS3 as well as the real router environment, and we improved the detection accuracy by 4% on average compared to our former work.

S
Wang, Y., Sun, C., Kuan, P., Lu, C., Wang, H..  2018.  Secured graphic QR code with infrared watermark. 2018 IEEE International Conference on Applied System Invention (ICASI). :690–693.

The barcode is an important link between real life and the virtual world nowadays. One of the most common barcodes is QR code, which its appearance, black and white modules, is not visually pleasing. The QR code is applied to product packaging and campaign promotion in the market. There are more and more stores using QR code for transaction payment. If the QR code is altered or illegally duplicated, it will endanger the information security of users. Therefore, the study uses infrared watermarking to embed the infrared QR code information into the explicit QR code to strengthen the anti-counterfeiting features. The explicit graphic QR code is produced by data hiding with error diffusion in this study. With the optical characteristics of K, one of the four printed ink colors CMYK (Cyan, Magenta, Yellow, Black), only K can be rendered in infrared. Hence, we use the infrared watermarking to embed the implicit QR code information into the explicit graphic QR code. General QR code reader may be used to interpret explicit graphic QR code information. As for implicit QR code, it needs the infrared detector to extract its implicit QR code information. If the QR code is illegally copied, it will not show the hidden second QR code under infrared detection. In this study, infrared watermark hidden in the graphic QR code can enhance not only the aesthetics of QR code, but also the anti-counterfeiting feature. It can also be applied to printing related fields, such as security documents, banknotes, etc. in the future.