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Filters: Author is Swain, A. K.  [Clear All Filters]
Conference Paper
K, S. K., Sahoo, S., Mahapatra, A., Swain, A. K., Mahapatra, K. K..  2017.  Analysis of Side-Channel Attack AES Hardware Trojan Benchmarks against Countermeasures. 2017 IEEE Computer Society Annual Symposium on VLSI (ISVLSI). :574–579.

Hardware Trojan (HT) is one of the well known hardware security issue in research community in last one decade. HT research is mainly focused on HT detection, HT defense and designing novel HT's. HT's are inserted by an adversary for leaking secret data, denial of service attacks etc. Trojan benchmark circuits for processors, cryptography and communication protocols from Trust-hub are widely used in HT research. And power analysis based side channel attacks and designing countermeasures against side channel attacks is a well established research area. Trust-Hub provides a power based side-channel attack promoting Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) HT benchmarks for research. In this work, we analyze the strength of AES HT benchmarks in the presence well known side-channel attack countermeasures. Masking, Random delay insertion and tweaking the operating frequency of clock used in sensitive operations are applied on AES benchmarks. Simulation and power profiling studies confirm that side-channel promoting HT benchmarks are resilient against these selected countermeasures and even in the presence of these countermeasures; an adversary can get the sensitive data by triggering the HT.