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Nguyen, Thuy D., Irvine, Cynthia E..  2018.  Development of Industrial Network Forensics Lessons. Proceedings of the Fifth Cybersecurity Symposium. :7:1-7:5.
Most forensic investigators are trained to recognize abusive network behavior in conventional information systems, but they may not know how to detect anomalous traffic patterns in industrial control systems (ICS) that manage critical infrastructure services. We have developed and laboratory-tested hands-on teaching material to introduce students to forensics investigation of intrusions on an industrial network. Rather than using prototypes of ICS components, our approach utilizes commercial industrial products to provide students a more realistic simulation of an ICS network. The lessons cover four different types of attacks and the corresponding post-incident network data analysis.
Tacliad, Francisco, Nguyen, Thuy D., Gondree, Mark.  2017.  DoS Exploitation of Allen-Bradley's Legacy Protocol Through Fuzz Testing. Proceedings of the 3rd Annual Industrial Control System Security Workshop. :24–31.
EtherNet/IP is a TCP/IP-based industrial protocol commonly used in industrial control systems (ICS). TCP/IP connectivity to the outside world has enabled ICS operators to implement more agile practices, but it also has exposed these cyber-physical systems to cyber attacks. Using a custom Scapy-based fuzzer to test for implementation flaws in the EtherNet/IP software of commercial programmable logic controllers (PLC), we uncover a previously unreported denial-of-service (DoS) vulnerability in the Ethernet/IP implementation of the Rockwell Automation/Allen-Bradley MicroLogix 1100 PLC that, if exploited, can cause the PLC to fault. ICS-CERT recently announces this vulnerability in the security advisory ICSA-17-138-03. This paper describes this vulnerability, the development of an EtherNet/IP fuzzer, and an approach to remotely monitor for faults generated when fuzzing.