Visible to the public Biblio

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Gonçalves, Charles F., Menasche, Daniel S., Avritzer, Alberto, Antunes, Nuno, Vieira, Marco.  2020.  A Model-Based Approach to Anomaly Detection Trading Detection Time and False Alarm Rate. 2020 Mediterranean Communication and Computer Networking Conference (MedComNet). :1—8.
The complexity and ubiquity of modern computing systems is a fertile ground for anomalies, including security and privacy breaches. In this paper, we propose a new methodology that addresses the practical challenges to implement anomaly detection approaches. Specifically, it is challenging to define normal behavior comprehensively and to acquire data on anomalies in diverse cloud environments. To tackle those challenges, we focus on anomaly detection approaches based on system performance signatures. In particular, performance signatures have the potential of detecting zero-day attacks, as those approaches are based on detecting performance deviations and do not require detailed knowledge of attack history. The proposed methodology leverages an analytical performance model and experimentation, and allows to control the rate of false positives in a principled manner. The methodology is evaluated using the TPCx-V workload, which was profiled during a set of executions using resource exhaustion anomalies that emulate the effects of anomalies affecting system performance. The proposed approach was able to successfully detect the anomalies, with a low number of false positives (precision 90%-98%).
Wang, Brandon, Li, Xiaoye, de Aguiar, Leandro P., Menasche, Daniel S., Shafiq, Zubair.  2017.  Characterizing and Modeling Patching Practices of Industrial Control Systems. Proceedings of the 2017 ACM SIGMETRICS / International Conference on Measurement and Modeling of Computer Systems. :9–9.

Industrial Control Systems (ICS) are widely deployed in mission critical infrastructures such as manufacturing, energy, and transportation. The mission critical nature of ICS devices poses important security challenges for ICS vendors and asset owners. In particular, the patching of ICS devices is usually deferred to scheduled production outages so as to prevent potential operational disruption of critical systems. In this paper, we present the results from our longitudinal measurement and characterization study of ICS patching behavior. Our analysis of more than 100 thousand Internet-exposed ICS devices reveals that fewer than 30% upgrade to newer patched versions within 60 days of a vulnerability disclosure. Based on our measurement and analysis, we further propose a model to forecast the patching behavior of ICS devices.