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Vishwakarma, L., Das, D..  2020.  BSS: Blockchain Enabled Security System for Internet of Things Applications. 2020 IEEE 19th International Symposium on Network Computing and Applications (NCA). :1—4.

In the Internet of Things (IoT), devices can interconnect and communicate autonomously, which requires devices to authenticate each other to exchange meaningful information. Otherwise, these things become vulnerable to various attacks. The conventional security protocols are not suitable for IoT applications due to the high computation and storage demand. Therefore, we proposed a blockchain-enabled secure storage and communication scheme for IoT applications, called BSS. The scheme ensures identification, authentication, and data integrity. Our scheme uses the security advantages of blockchain and helps to create safe zones (trust batch) where authenticated objects interconnect securely and do communication. A secure and robust trust mechanism is employed to build these batches, where each device has to authenticate itself before joining the trust batch. The obtained results satisfy the IoT security requirements with 60% reduced computation, storage and communication cost compared with state-of-the-art schemes. BSS also withstands various cyberattacks such as impersonation, message replay, man-in-the-middle, and botnet attacks.

Das, D., Meiser, S., Mohammadi, E., Kate, A..  2018.  Anonymity Trilemma: Strong Anonymity, Low Bandwidth Overhead, Low Latency - Choose Two. 2018 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (SP). :108–126.

This work investigates the fundamental constraints of anonymous communication (AC) protocols. We analyze the relationship between bandwidth overhead, latency overhead, and sender anonymity or recipient anonymity against the global passive (network-level) adversary. We confirm the trilemma that an AC protocol can only achieve two out of the following three properties: strong anonymity (i.e., anonymity up to a negligible chance), low bandwidth overhead, and low latency overhead. We further study anonymity against a stronger global passive adversary that can additionally passively compromise some of the AC protocol nodes. For a given number of compromised nodes, we derive necessary constraints between bandwidth and latency overhead whose violation make it impossible for an AC protocol to achieve strong anonymity. We analyze prominent AC protocols from the literature and depict to which extent those satisfy our necessary constraints. Our fundamental necessary constraints offer a guideline not only for improving existing AC systems but also for designing novel AC protocols with non-traditional bandwidth and latency overhead choices.