Visible to the public Biblio

Filters: Author is Steinfeld, Ron  [Clear All Filters]
A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z 
R
Lai, Shangqi, Patranabis, Sikhar, Sakzad, Amin, Liu, Joseph K., Mukhopadhyay, Debdeep, Steinfeld, Ron, Sun, Shi-Feng, Liu, Dongxi, Zuo, Cong.  2018.  Result Pattern Hiding Searchable Encryption for Conjunctive Queries. Proceedings of the 2018 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security. :745–762.

The recently proposed Oblivious Cross-Tags (OXT) protocol (CRYPTO 2013) has broken new ground in designing efficient searchable symmetric encryption (SSE) protocol with support for conjunctive keyword search in a single-writer single-reader framework. While the OXT protocol offers high performance by adopting a number of specialised data-structures, it also trades-off security by leaking 'partial' database information to the server. Recent attacks have exploited similar partial information leakage to breach database confidentiality. Consequently, it is an open problem to design SSE protocols that plug such leakages while retaining similar efficiency. In this paper, we propose a new SSE protocol, called Hidden Cross-Tags (HXT), that removes 'Keyword Pair Result Pattern' (KPRP) leakage for conjunctive keyword search. We avoid this leakage by adopting two additional cryptographic primitives - Hidden Vector Encryption (HVE) and probabilistic (Bloom filter) indexing into the HXT protocol. We propose a 'lightweight' HVE scheme that only uses efficient symmetric-key building blocks, and entirely avoids elliptic curve-based operations. At the same time, it affords selective simulation-security against an unbounded number of secret-key queries. Adopting this efficient HVE scheme, the overall practical storage and computational overheads of HXT over OXT are relatively small (no more than 10% for two keywords query, and 21% for six keywords query), while providing a higher level of security.

P
Sun, Shi-Feng, Yuan, Xingliang, Liu, Joseph K., Steinfeld, Ron, Sakzad, Amin, Vo, Viet, Nepal, Surya.  2018.  Practical Backward-Secure Searchable Encryption from Symmetric Puncturable Encryption. Proceedings of the 2018 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security. :763-780.

Symmetric Searchable Encryption (SSE) has received wide attention due to its practical application in searching on encrypted data. Beyond search, data addition and deletion are also supported in dynamic SSE schemes. Unfortunately, these update operations leak some information of updated data. To address this issue, forward-secure SSE is actively explored to protect the relations of newly updated data and previously searched keywords. On the contrary, little work has been done in backward security, which enforces that search should not reveal information of deleted data. In this paper, we propose the first practical and non-interactive backward-secure SSE scheme. In particular, we introduce a new form of symmetric encryption, named symmetric puncturable encryption (SPE), and construct a generic primitive from simple cryptographic tools. Based on this primitive, we then present a backward-secure SSE scheme that can revoke a server's searching ability on deleted data. We instantiate our scheme with a practical puncturable pseudorandom function and implement it on a large dataset. The experimental results demonstrate its efficiency and scalability. Compared to the state-of-the-art, our scheme achieves a speedup of almost 50x in search latency, and a saving of 62% in server storage consumption.

M
Xu, Lei, Yuan, Xingliang, Steinfeld, Ron, Wang, Cong, Xu, Chungen.  2019.  Multi-Writer Searchable Encryption: An LWE-Based Realization and Implementation. Proceedings of the 2019 ACM Asia Conference on Computer and Communications Security. :122–133.
Multi-Writer Searchable Encryption, also known as public-key encryption with keyword search(PEKS), serves a wide spectrum of data sharing applications. It allows users to search over encrypted data encrypted via different keys. However, most of the existing PEKS schemes are built on classic security assumptions, which are proven to be untenable to overcome the threats of quantum computers. To address the above problem, in this paper, we propose a lattice-based searchable encryption scheme from the learning with errors (LWE) hardness assumption. Specifically, we observe that the keys of each user in a basic scheme are composed of large-sized matrices and basis of the lattice. To reduce the complexity of key management, our scheme is designed to enable users to directly use their identity for data encryption. We present several optimization techniques for implementation to make our design nearly practical. For completeness, we conduct rigorous security, complexity, and parameter analysis on our scheme, and perform comprehensive evaluations at a commodity machine. With a scenario of 100 users, the cost of key generation for each user is 125s, and the cost of searching a document with 1000 keywords is 13.4ms.