Visible to the public Biblio

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Conference Paper
Squarcina, Marco, Calzavara, Stefano, Maffei, Matteo.  2021.  The Remote on the Local: Exacerbating Web Attacks Via Service Workers Caches. 2021 IEEE Security and Privacy Workshops (SPW). :432—443.
Service workers boost the user experience of modern web applications by taking advantage of the Cache API to improve responsiveness and support offline usage. In this paper, we present the first security analysis of the threats posed by this programming practice, identifying an attack with major security implications. In particular, we show how a traditional XSS attack can abuse the Cache API to escalate into a personin-the-middle attack against cached content, thus compromising its confidentiality and integrity. Remarkably, this attack enables new threats which are beyond the scope of traditional XSS. After defining the attack, we study its prevalence in the wild, finding that the large majority of the sites which register service workers using the Cache API are vulnerable as long as a single webpage in the same origin of the service worker is affected by an XSS. Finally, we propose a browser-side countermeasure against this attack, and we analyze its effectiveness and practicality in terms of security benefits and backward compatibility with existing web applications.
Squarcina, Marco, Calzavara, Stefano, Maffei, Matteo.  2021.  The Remote on the Local: Exacerbating Web Attacks Via Service Workers Caches. 2021 IEEE Security and Privacy Workshops (SPW). :432—443.
Service workers boost the user experience of modern web applications by taking advantage of the Cache API to improve responsiveness and support offline usage. In this paper, we present the first security analysis of the threats posed by this programming practice, identifying an attack with major security implications. In particular, we show how a traditional XSS attack can abuse the Cache API to escalate into a personin-the-middle attack against cached content, thus compromising its confidentiality and integrity. Remarkably, this attack enables new threats which are beyond the scope of traditional XSS. After defining the attack, we study its prevalence in the wild, finding that the large majority of the sites which register service workers using the Cache API are vulnerable as long as a single webpage in the same origin of the service worker is affected by an XSS. Finally, we propose a browser-side countermeasure against this attack, and we analyze its effectiveness and practicality in terms of security benefits and backward compatibility with existing web applications.
Calzavara, Stefano, Focardi, Riccardo, Squarcina, Marco, Tempesta, Mauro.  2018.  Surviving the Web: A Journey into Web Session Security. Companion Proceedings of the The Web Conference 2018. :451-455.
We survey the most common attacks against web sessions, i.e., attacks which target honest web browser users establishing an authenticated session with a trusted web application. We then review existing security solutions which prevent or mitigate the different attacks, by evaluating them along four different axes: protection, usability, compatibility and ease of deployment. Based on this survey, we identify five guidelines that, to different extents, have been taken into account by the designers of the different proposals we reviewed. We believe that these guidelines can be helpful for the development of innovative solutions approaching web security in a more systematic and comprehensive way.