Visible to the public Biblio

Filters: Author is Tehranipoor, M.  [Clear All Filters]
2015-05-06
Markman, A., Javidi, B., Tehranipoor, M..  2014.  Photon-Counting Security Tagging and Verification Using Optically Encoded QR Codes. Photonics Journal, IEEE. 6:1-9.

We propose an optical security method for object authentication using photon-counting encryption implemented with phase encoded QR codes. By combining the full phase double-random-phase encryption with photon-counting imaging method and applying an iterative Huffman coding technique, we are able to encrypt and compress an image containing primary information about the object. This data can then be stored inside of an optically phase encoded QR code for robust read out, decryption, and authentication. The optically encoded QR code is verified by examining the speckle signature of the optical masks using statistical analysis. Optical experimental results are presented to demonstrate the performance of the system. In addition, experiments with a commercial Smartphone to read the optically encoded QR code are presented. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first report on integrating photon-counting security with optically phase encoded QR codes.
 

Tehranipoor, M., Forte, D..  2014.  Tutorial T4: All You Need to Know about Hardware Trojans and Counterfeit ICs. VLSI Design and 2014 13th International Conference on Embedded Systems, 2014 27th International Conference on. :9-10.

The migration from a vertical to horizontal business model has made it easier to introduce hardware Trojans and counterfeit electronic parts into the electronic component supply chain. Hardware Trojans are malicious modifications made to original IC designs that reduce system integrity (change functionality, leak private data, etc.). Counterfeit parts are often below specification and/or of substandard quality. The existence of Trojans and counterfeit parts creates risks for the life-critical systems and infrastructures that incorporate them including automotive, aerospace, military, and medical systems. In this tutorial, we will cover: (i) Background and motivation for hardware Trojan and counterfeit prevention/detection; (ii) Taxonomies related to both topics; (iii) Existing solutions; (iv) Open challenges; (v) New and unified solutions to address these challenges.
 

2017-03-08
Yang, K., Forte, D., Tehranipoor, M..  2015.  An RFID-based technology for electronic component and system Counterfeit detection and Traceability. 2015 IEEE International Symposium on Technologies for Homeland Security (HST). :1–6.

The vulnerabilities in today's supply chain have raised serious concerns about the security and trustworthiness of electronic components and systems. Testing for device provenance, detection of counterfeit integrated circuits/systems, and traceability are challenging issues to address. In this paper, we develop a novel RFID-based system suitable for electronic component and system Counterfeit detection and System Traceability called CST. CST is composed of different types of on-chip sensors and in-system structures that provide the information needed to detect multiple counterfeit IC types (recycled, cloned, etc.), verify the authenticity of the system with some degree of confidence, and track/identify boards. Central to CST is an RFID tag employed as storage and a channel to read the information from different types of chips on the printed circuit board (PCB) in both power-off and power-on scenarios. Simulations and experimental results using Spartan 3E FPGAs demonstrate the effectiveness of this system. The efficiency of the radio frequency (RF) communication has also been verified via a PCB prototype with a printed slot antenna.

2017-05-17
Xiao, K., Forte, D., Jin, Y., Karri, R., Bhunia, S., Tehranipoor, M..  2016.  Hardware Trojans: Lessons Learned After One Decade of Research. ACM Trans. Des. Autom. Electron. Syst.. 22:6:1–6:23.

Given the increasing complexity of modern electronics and the cost of fabrication, entities from around the globe have become more heavily involved in all phases of the electronics supply chain. In this environment, hardware Trojans (i.e., malicious modifications or inclusions made by untrusted third parties) pose major security concerns, especially for those integrated circuits (ICs) and systems used in critical applications and cyber infrastructure. While hardware Trojans have been explored significantly in academia over the last decade, there remains room for improvement. In this article, we examine the research on hardware Trojans from the last decade and attempt to capture the lessons learned. A comprehensive adversarial model taxonomy is introduced and used to examine the current state of the art. Then the past countermeasures and publication trends are categorized based on the adversarial model and topic. Through this analysis, we identify what has been covered and the important problems that are underinvestigated. We also identify the most critical lessons for those new to the field and suggest a roadmap for future hardware Trojan research.

2017-12-12
Contreras, G. K., Nahiyan, A., Bhunia, S., Forte, D., Tehranipoor, M..  2017.  Security vulnerability analysis of design-for-test exploits for asset protection in SoCs. 2017 22nd Asia and South Pacific Design Automation Conference (ASP-DAC). :617–622.

SoCs implementing security modules should be both testable and secure. Oversights in a design's test structure could expose internal modules creating security vulnerabilities during test. In this paper, for the first time, we propose a novel automated security vulnerability analysis framework to identify violations of confidentiality, integrity, and availability policies caused by test structures and designer oversights during SoC integration. Results demonstrate existing information leakage vulnerabilities in implementations of various encryption algorithms and secure microprocessors. These can be exploited to obtain secret keys, control finite state machines, or gain unauthorized access to memory read/write functions.

2018-01-23
Zhang, Dongrong, He, Miao, Wang, Xiaoxiao, Tehranipoor, M..  2017.  Dynamically obfuscated scan for protecting IPs against scan-based attacks throughout supply chain. 2017 IEEE 35th VLSI Test Symposium (VTS). :1–6.

Scan-based test is commonly used to increase testability and fault coverage, however, it is also known to be a liability for chip security. Research has shown that intellectual property (IP) or secret keys can be leaked through scan-based attacks. In this paper, we propose a dynamically-obfuscated scan design for protecting IPs against scan-based attacks. By perturbing all test patterns/responses and protecting the obfuscation key, the proposed architecture is proven to be robust against existing non-invasive scan attacks, and can protect all scan data from attackers in foundry, assembly, and system developers (i.e., OEMs) without compromising the testability. Furthermore, the proposed architecture can be easily plugged into EDA generated scan chains without having a noticeable impact on conventional integrated circuit (IC) design, manufacturing, and test flow. Finally, detailed security and experimental analyses have been performed on several benchmarks. The results demonstrate that the proposed method can protect chips from existing brute force, differential, and other scan-based attacks that target the obfuscation key. The proposed design is of low overhead on area, power consumption, and pattern generation time, and there is no impact on test time.

Karam, R., Hoque, T., Ray, S., Tehranipoor, M., Bhunia, S..  2017.  MUTARCH: Architectural diversity for FPGA device and IP security. 2017 22nd Asia and South Pacific Design Automation Conference (ASP-DAC). :611–616.
Field Programmable Gate Arrays (FPGAs) are being increasingly deployed in diverse applications including the emerging Internet of Things (IoT), biomedical, and automotive systems. However, security of the FPGA configuration file (i.e. bitstream), especially during in-field reconfiguration, as well as effective safeguards against unauthorized tampering and piracy during operation, are notably lacking. The current practice of bitstreram encryption is only available in high-end FPGAs, incurs unacceptably high overhead for area/energy-constrained devices, and is susceptible to side channel attacks. In this paper, we present a fundamentally different and novel approach to FPGA security that can protect against all major attacks on FPGA, namely, unauthorized in-field reprogramming, piracy of FPGA intellectual property (IP) blocks, and targeted malicious modification of the bitstream. Our approach employs the security through diversity principle to FPGA, which is often used in the software domain. We make each device architecturally different from the others using both physical (static) and logical (time-varying) configuration keys, ensuring that attackers cannot use a priori knowledge about one device to mount an attack on another. It therefore mitigates the economic motivation for attackers to reverse engineering the bitstream and IP. The approach is compatible with modern remote upgrade techniques, and requires only small modifications to existing FPGA tool flows, making it an attractive addition to the FPGA security suite. Our experimental results show that the proposed approach achieves provably high security against tampering and piracy with worst-case 14% latency overhead and 13% area overhead.
2018-04-11
Nahiyan, A., Sadi, M., Vittal, R., Contreras, G., Forte, D., Tehranipoor, M..  2017.  Hardware Trojan Detection through Information Flow Security Verification. 2017 IEEE International Test Conference (ITC). :1–10.

Semiconductor design houses are increasingly becoming dependent on third party vendors to procure intellectual property (IP) and meet time-to-market constraints. However, these third party IPs cannot be trusted as hardware Trojans can be maliciously inserted into them by untrusted vendors. While different approaches have been proposed to detect Trojans in third party IPs, their limitations have not been extensively studied. In this paper, we analyze the limitations of the state-of-the-art Trojan detection techniques and demonstrate with experimental results how to defeat these detection mechanisms. We then propose a Trojan detection framework based on information flow security (IFS) verification. Our framework detects violation of IFS policies caused by Trojans without the need of white-box knowledge of the IP. We experimentally validate the efficacy of our proposed technique by accurately identifying Trojans in the trust-hub benchmarks. We also demonstrate that our technique does not share the limitations of the previously proposed Trojan detection techniques.