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Ani, U. D., He, H., Tiwari, A..  2020.  Vulnerability-Based Impact Criticality Estimation for Industrial Control Systems. 2020 International Conference on Cyber Security and Protection of Digital Services (Cyber Security). :1—8.

Cyber threats directly affect the critical reliability and availability of modern Industry Control Systems (ICS) in respects of operations and processes. Where there are a variety of vulnerabilities and cyber threats, it is necessary to effectively evaluate cyber security risks, and control uncertainties of cyber environments, and quantitative evaluation can be helpful. To effectively and timely control the spread and impact produced by attacks on ICS networks, a probabilistic Multi-Attribute Vulnerability Criticality Analysis (MAVCA) model for impact estimation and prioritised remediation is presented. This offer a new approach for combining three major attributes: vulnerability severities influenced by environmental factors, the attack probabilities relative to the vulnerabilities, and functional dependencies attributed to vulnerability host components. A miniature ICS testbed evaluation illustrates the usability of the model for determining the weakest link and setting security priority in the ICS. This work can help create speedy and proactive security response. The metrics derived in this work can serve as sub-metrics inputs to a larger quantitative security metrics taxonomy; and can be integrated into the security risk assessment scheme of a larger distributed system.

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Subramanyan, P., Tsiskaridze, N., Wenchao Li, Gascon, A., Wei Yang Tan, Tiwari, A., Shankar, N., Seshia, S.A., Malik, S..  2014.  Reverse Engineering Digital Circuits Using Structural and Functional Analyses. Emerging Topics in Computing, IEEE Transactions on. 2:63-80.

Integrated circuits (ICs) are now designed and fabricated in a globalized multivendor environment making them vulnerable to malicious design changes, the insertion of hardware Trojans/malware, and intellectual property (IP) theft. Algorithmic reverse engineering of digital circuits can mitigate these concerns by enabling analysts to detect malicious hardware, verify the integrity of ICs, and detect IP violations. In this paper, we present a set of algorithms for the reverse engineering of digital circuits starting from an unstructured netlist and resulting in a high-level netlist with components such as register files, counters, adders, and subtractors. Our techniques require no manual intervention and experiments show that they determine the functionality of >45% and up to 93% of the gates in each of the test circuits that we examine. We also demonstrate that our algorithms are scalable to real designs by experimenting with a very large, highly-optimized system-on-chip (SOC) design with over 375000 combinational elements. Our inference algorithms cover 68% of the gates in this SOC. We also demonstrate that our algorithms are effective in aiding a human analyst to detect hardware Trojans in an unstructured netlist.