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Chen, Yu-Cheng, Mooney, Vincent, Grijalva, Santiago.  2019.  A Survey of Attack Models for Cyber-Physical Security Assessment in Electricity Grid. 2019 IFIP/IEEE 27th International Conference on Very Large Scale Integration (VLSI-SoC). :242–243.
This paper surveys some prior work regarding attack models in a cyber-physical system and discusses the potential benefits. For comparison, the full paper will model a bad data injection attack scenario in power grid using the surveyed prior work.
Chen, Yu-Cheng, Gieseking, Tim, Campbell, Dustin, Mooney, Vincent, Grijalva, Santiago.  2019.  A Hybrid Attack Model for Cyber-Physical Security Assessment in Electricity Grid. 2019 IEEE Texas Power and Energy Conference (TPEC). :1–6.
A detailed model of an attack on the power grid involves both a preparation stage as well as an execution stage of the attack. This paper introduces a novel Hybrid Attack Model (HAM) that combines Probabilistic Learning Attacker, Dynamic Defender (PLADD) model and a Markov Chain model to simulate the planning and execution stages of a bad data injection attack in power grid. We discuss the advantages and limitations of the prior work models and of our proposed Hybrid Attack Model and show that HAM is more effective compared to individual PLADD or Markov Chain models.
Xiong, Leilei, Grijalva, Santiago.  2019.  N-1 RTU Cyber-Physical Security Assessment Using State Estimation. 2019 IEEE Power Energy Society General Meeting (PESGM). :1–5.
Real-time supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) systems use remote terminal units (RTUs) to monitor and manage the flow of power at electrical substations. As their connectivity to different utility and private networks increases, RTUs are becoming more vulnerable to cyber-attacks. Some attacks seek to access RTUs to directly control power system devices with the intent to shed load or cause equipment damage. Other attacks (such as denial-of-service) target network availability and seek to block, delay, or corrupt communications between the RTU and the control center. In the most severe case, when communications are entirely blocked, the loss of an RTU can cause the power system to become unobservable. It is important to understand how losing an RTU impacts the system state (bus voltage magnitudes and angles). The system state is determined by the state estimator and serves as the input to other critical EMS applications. There is currently no systematic approach for assessing the cyber-physical impact of losing RTUs. This paper proposes a methodology for N-1 RTU cyber-physical security assessment that could benefit power system control and operation. We demonstrate our approach on the IEEE 14-bus system as well as on a synthetic 200-bus system.