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Zhang, Yifei, Gao, Neng, Chen, Junsha.  2020.  A Practical Defense against Attribute Inference Attacks in Session-based Recommendations. 2020 IEEE International Conference on Web Services (ICWS). :355–363.
When users in various web and mobile applications enjoy the convenience of recommendation systems, they are vulnerable to attribute inference attacks. The accumulating online behaviors of users (e.g., clicks, searches, ratings) naturally brings out user preferences, and poses an inevitable threat of privacy that adversaries can infer one's private profiles (e.g., gender, sexual orientation, political view) with AI-based algorithms. Existing defense methods assume the existence of a trusted third party, rely on computationally intractable algorithms, or have impact on recommendation utility. These imperfections make them impractical for privacy preservation in real-life scenarios. In this work, we introduce BiasBooster, a practical proactive defense method based on behavior segmentation, to protect user privacy against attribute inference attacks from user behaviors, while retaining recommendation utility with a heuristic recommendation aggregation module. BiasBooster is a user-centric approach from client side, which proactively divides a user's behaviors into weakly related segments and perform them with several dummy identities, then aggregates real-time recommendations for user from different dummy identities. We estimate its effectiveness of preservation on both privacy and recommendation utility through extensive evaluations on two real-world datasets. A Chrome extension is conducted to demonstrate the feasibility of applying BiasBooster in real world. Experimental results show that compared to existing defenses, BiasBooster substantially reduces the averaged accuracy of attribute inference attacks, with minor utility loss of recommendations.
Ge, Jingquan, Gao, Neng, Tu, Chenyang, Xiang, Ji, Liu, Zeyi.  2019.  More Secure Collaborative APIs Resistant to Flush+Reload and Flush+Flush Attacks on ARMv8-A. 2019 26th Asia-Pacific Software Engineering Conference (APSEC). :410—417.
With the popularity of smart devices such as mobile phones and tablets, the security problem of the widely used ARMv8-A processor has received more and more attention. Flush+Reload and Flush+Flush cache attacks have become two of the most important security threats due to their low noise and high resolution. In order to resist Flush+Reload and Flush+Flush attacks, researchers proposed many defense methods. However, these existing methods have various shortcomings. The runtime defense methods using hardware performance counters cannot detect attacks fast enough, effectively detect Flush+Flush or avoid a high false positive rate. Static code analysis schemes are powerless for obfuscation techniques. The approaches of permanently reducing the resolution can only be utilized on browser products and cannot be applied in the system. In this paper, we design two more secure collaborative APIs-flush operation API and high resolution time API-which can resist Flush+Reload and Flush+Flush attacks. When the flush operation API is called, the high resolution time API temporarily reduces its resolution and automatically restores. Moreover, the flush operation API also has the ability to detect and handle suspected Flush+Reload and Flush+Flush attacks. The attack and performance comparison experiments prove that the two APIs we designed are safer and the performance losses are acceptable.