Visible to the public Biblio

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Kuai, Jun, He, Jiaji, Ma, Haocheng, Zhao, Yiqiang, Hou, Yumin, Jin, Yier.  2020.  WaLo: Security Primitive Generator for RT-Level Logic Locking and Watermarking. 2020 Asian Hardware Oriented Security and Trust Symposium (AsianHOST). :01—06.
Various hardware security solutions have been developed recently to help counter hardware level attacks such as hardware Trojan, integrated circuit (IC) counterfeiting and intellectual property (IP) clone/piracy. However, existing solutions often provide specific types of protections. While these solutions achieve great success in preventing even advanced hardware attacks, the compatibility of among these hardware security methods are rarely discussed. The inconsistency hampers with the development of a comprehensive solution for hardware IC and IP from various attacks. In this paper, we develop a security primitive generator to help solve the compatibility issue among different protection techniques. Specifically, we focus on two modern IC/IP protection methods, logic locking and watermarking. A combined locking and watermarking technique is developed based on enhanced finite state machines (FSMs). The security primitive generator will take user-specified constraints and automatically generate an FSM module to perform both logic locking and watermarking. The generated FSM can be integrated into any designs for protection. Our experimental results show that the generator can facilitate circuit protection and provide the flexibility for users to achieve a better tradeoff between security levels and design overheads.
Guo, Xiaolong, Dutta, Raj Gautam, He, Jiaji, Tehranipoor, Mark M., Jin, Yier.  2019.  QIF-Verilog: Quantitative Information-Flow based Hardware Description Languages for Pre-Silicon Security Assessment. 2019 IEEE International Symposium on Hardware Oriented Security and Trust (HOST). :91—100.
Hardware vulnerabilities are often due to design mistakes because the designer does not sufficiently consider potential security vulnerabilities at the design stage. As a result, various security solutions have been developed to protect ICs, among which the language-based hardware security verification serves as a promising solution. The verification process will be performed while compiling the HDL of the design. However, similar to other formal verification methods, the language-based approach also suffers from scalability issue. Furthermore, existing solutions either lead to hardware overhead or are not designed for vulnerable or malicious logic detection. To alleviate these challenges, we propose a new language based framework, QIF-Verilog, to evaluate the trustworthiness of a hardware system at register transfer level (RTL). This framework introduces a quantified information flow (QIF) model and extends Verilog type systems to provide more expressiveness in presenting security rules; QIF is capable of checking the security rules given by the hardware designer. Secrets are labeled by the new type and then parsed to data flow, to which a QIF model will be applied. To demonstrate our approach, we design a compiler for QIF-Verilog and perform vulnerability analysis on benchmarks from Trust-Hub and OpenCore. We show that Trojans or design faults that leak information from circuit outputs can be detected automatically, and that our method evaluates the security of the design correctly.