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Lim, Wei Yang Bryan, Xiong, Zehui, Niyato, Dusit, Huang, Jianqiang, Hua, Xian-Sheng, Miao, Chunyan.  2020.  Incentive Mechanism Design for Federated Learning in the Internet of Vehicles. 2020 IEEE 92nd Vehicular Technology Conference (VTC2020-Fall). :1—5.
In the Internet of Vehicles (IoV) paradigm, a model owner is able to leverage on the enhanced capabilities of Intelligent Connected Vehicles (ICV) to develop promising Artificial Intelligence (AI) based applications, e.g., for traffic efficiency. However, in some cases, a model owner may have insufficient data samples to build an effective AI model. To this end, we propose a Federated Learning (FL) based privacy preserving approach to facilitate collaborative FL among multiple model owners in the IoV. Our system model enables collaborative model training without compromising data privacy given that only the model parameters instead of the raw data are exchanged within the federation. However, there are two main challenges of incentive mismatches between workers and model owners, as well as among model owners. For the former, we leverage on the self-revealing mechanism in contract theory under information asymmetry. For the latter, we use the coalitional game theory approach that rewards model owners based on their marginal contributions. The numerical results validate the performance efficiency of our proposed hierarchical incentive mechanism design.
Huang, Yunhan, Xiong, Zehui, Zhu, Quanyan.  2021.  Cross-Layer Coordinated Attacks on Cyber-Physical Systems: A LQG Game Framework with Controlled Observations. 2021 European Control Conference (ECC). :521–528.
This work establishes a game-theoretic framework to study cross-layer coordinated attacks on cyber-physical systems (CPSs). The attacker can interfere with the physical process and launch jamming attacks on the communication channels simultaneously. At the same time, the defender can dodge the jamming by dispensing with observations. The generic framework captures a wide variety of classic attack models on CPSs. Leveraging dynamic programming techniques, we fully characterize the Subgame Perfect Equilibrium (SPE) control strategies. We also derive the SPE observation and jamming strategies and provide efficient computational methods to compute them. The results demonstrate that the physical and cyber attacks are coordinated and depend on each other.On the one hand, the control strategies are linear in the state estimate, and the estimate error caused by jamming attacks will induce performance degradation. On the other hand, the interactions between the attacker and the defender in the physical layer significantly impact the observation and jamming strategies. Numerical examples illustrate the inter-actions between the defender and the attacker through their observation and jamming strategies.