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Camenisch, Jan, Drijvers, Manu, Lehmann, Anja, Neven, Gregory, Towa, Patrick.  2020.  Zone Encryption with Anonymous Authentication for V2V Communication. 2020 IEEE European Symposium on Security and Privacy (EuroS P). :405—424.

Vehicle-to-vehicle (V2V) communication systems are currently being prepared for real-world deployment, but they face strong opposition over privacy concerns. Position beacon messages are the main culprit, being broadcast in cleartext and pseudonymously signed up to 10 times per second. So far, no practical solutions have been proposed to encrypt or anonymously authenticate V2V messages. We propose two cryptographic innovations that enhance the privacy of V2V communication. As a core contribution, we introduce zone-encryption schemes, where vehicles generate and authentically distribute encryption keys associated to static geographic zones close to their location. Zone encryption provides security against eavesdropping, and, combined with a suitable anonymous authentication scheme, ensures that messages can only be sent by genuine vehicles, while adding only 224 Bytes of cryptographic overhead to each message. Our second contribution is an authentication mechanism fine-tuned to the needs of V2V which allows vehicles to authentically distribute keys, and is called dynamic group signatures with attributes. Our instantiation features unlimited locally generated pseudonyms, negligible credential download-and-storage costs, identity recovery by a trusted authority, and compact signatures of 216 Bytes at a 128-bit security level.

Ambrosin, Moreno, Conti, Mauro, Ibrahim, Ahmad, Neven, Gregory, Sadeghi, Ahmad-Reza, Schunter, Matthias.  2016.  SANA: Secure and Scalable Aggregate Network Attestation. Proceedings of the 2016 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security. :731–742.

Large numbers of smart connected devices, also named as the Internet of Things (IoT), are permeating our environments (homes, factories, cars, and also our body - with wearable devices) to collect data and act on the insight derived. Ensuring software integrity (including OS, apps, and configurations) on such smart devices is then essential to guarantee both privacy and safety. A key mechanism to protect the software integrity of these devices is remote attestation: A process that allows a remote verifier to validate the integrity of the software of a device. This process usually makes use of a signed hash value of the actual device's software, generated by dedicated hardware. While individual device attestation is a well-established technique, to date integrity verification of a very large number of devices remains an open problem, due to scalability issues. In this paper, we present SANA, the first secure and scalable protocol for efficient attestation of large sets of devices that works under realistic assumptions. SANA relies on a novel signature scheme to allow anyone to publicly verify a collective attestation in constant time and space, for virtually an unlimited number of devices. We substantially improve existing swarm attestation schemes by supporting a realistic trust model where: (1) only the targeted devices are required to implement attestation; (2) compromising any device does not harm others; and (3) all aggregators can be untrusted. We implemented SANA and demonstrated its efficiency on tiny sensor devices. Furthermore, we simulated SANA at large scale, to assess its scalability. Our results show that SANA can provide efficient attestation of networks of 1,000,000 devices, in only 2.5 seconds.