Visible to the public Biblio

Filters: Author is Zeitouni, Shaza  [Clear All Filters]
A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z 
A
Brasser, Ferdinand, Davi, Lucas, Dhavlle, Abhijitt, Frassetto, Tommaso, Dinakarrao, Sai Manoj Pudukotai, Rafatirad, Setareh, Sadeghi, Ahmad-Reza, Sasan, Avesta, Sayadi, Hossein, Zeitouni, Shaza et al..  2018.  Advances and Throwbacks in Hardware-assisted Security: Special Session. Proceedings of the International Conference on Compilers, Architecture and Synthesis for Embedded Systems. :15:1–15:10.
Hardware security architectures and primitives are becoming increasingly important in practice providing trust anchors and trusted execution environment to protect modern software systems. Over the past two decades we have witnessed various hardware security solutions and trends from Trusted Platform Modules (TPM), performance counters for security, ARM's TrustZone, and Physically Unclonable Functions (PUFs), to very recent advances such as Intel's Software Guard Extension (SGX). Unfortunately, these solutions are rarely used by third party developers, make strong trust assumptions (including in manufacturers), are too expensive for small constrained devices, do not easily scale, or suffer from information leakage. Academic research has proposed a variety of solutions, in hardware security architectures, these advancements are rarely deployed in practice.
D
Ibrahim, Ahmad, Sadeghi, Ahmad-Reza, Tsudik, Gene, Zeitouni, Shaza.  2016.  DARPA: Device Attestation Resilient to Physical Attacks. Proceedings of the 9th ACM Conference on Security & Privacy in Wireless and Mobile Networks. :171–182.

As embedded devices (under the guise of "smart-whatever") rapidly proliferate into many domains, they become attractive targets for malware. Protecting them from software and physical attacks becomes both important and challenging. Remote attestation is a basic tool for mitigating such attacks. It allows a trusted party (verifier) to remotely assess software integrity of a remote, untrusted, and possibly compromised, embedded device (prover). Prior remote attestation methods focus on software (malware) attacks in a one-verifier/one-prover setting. Physical attacks on provers are generally ruled out as being either unrealistic or impossible to mitigate. In this paper, we argue that physical attacks must be considered, particularly, in the context of many provers, e.g., a network, of devices. As- suming that physical attacks require capture and subsequent temporary disablement of the victim device(s), we propose DARPA, a light-weight protocol that takes advantage of absence detection to identify suspected devices. DARPA is resilient against a very strong adversary and imposes minimal additional hardware requirements. We justify and identify DARPA's design goals and evaluate its security and costs.