Visible to the public Biblio

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Pennekamp, Jan, Alder, Fritz, Matzutt, Roman, Mühlberg, Jan Tobias, Piessens, Frank, Wehrle, Klaus.  2020.  Secure End-to-End Sensing in Supply Chains. 2020 IEEE Conference on Communications and Network Security (CNS). :1—6.
Trust along digitalized supply chains is challenged by the aspect that monitoring equipment may not be trustworthy or unreliable as respective measurements originate from potentially untrusted parties. To allow for dynamic relationships along supply chains, we propose a blockchain-backed supply chain monitoring architecture relying on trusted hardware. Our design provides a notion of secure end-to-end sensing of interactions even when originating from untrusted surroundings. Due to attested checkpointing, we can identify misinformation early on and reliably pinpoint the origin. A blockchain enables long-term verifiability for all (now trustworthy) IoT data within our system even if issues are detected only after the fact. Our feasibility study and cost analysis further show that our design is indeed deployable in and applicable to today’s supply chain settings.
Winderix, Hans, Mühlberg, Jan Tobias, Piessens, Frank.  2021.  Compiler-Assisted Hardening of Embedded Software Against Interrupt Latency Side-Channel Attacks. 2021 IEEE European Symposium on Security and Privacy (EuroS&P). :667—682.
Recent controlled-channel attacks exploit timing differences in the rudimentary fetch-decode-execute logic of processors. These new attacks also pose a threat to software on embedded systems. Even when Trusted Execution Environments (TEEs) are used, interrupt latency attacks allow untrusted code to extract application secrets from a vulnerable enclave by scheduling interruption of the enclave. Constant-time programming is effective against these attacks but, as we explain in this paper, can come with some disadvantages regarding performance. To deal with this new threat, we propose a novel algorithm that hardens programs during compilation by aligning the execution time of corresponding instructions in secret-dependent branches. Our results show that, on a class of embedded systems with deterministic execution times, this approach eliminates interrupt latency side-channel leaks and mitigates limitations of constant-time programming. We have implemented our approach in the LLVM compiler infrastructure for the San-cus TEE, which extends the openMSP430 microcontroller, and we discuss applicability to other architectures. We make our implementation and benchmarks available for further research.