Visible to the public Biblio

Filters: Author is Tosh, D.  [Clear All Filters]
2019
Buenrostro, E. D., Rivera, A. O. G., Tosh, D., Acosta, J. C., Njilla, L..  2019.  Evaluating Usability of Permissioned Blockchain for Internet-of-Battlefield Things Security. MILCOM 2019 - 2019 IEEE Military Communications Conference (MILCOM). :841—846.

Military technology is ever-evolving to increase the safety and security of soldiers on the field while integrating Internet-of-Things solutions to improve operational efficiency in mission oriented tasks in the battlefield. Centralized communication technology is the traditional network model used for battlefields and is vulnerable to denial of service attacks, therefore suffers performance hazards. They also lead to a central point of failure, due to which, a flexible model that is mobile, resilient, and effective for different scenarios must be proposed. Blockchain offers a distributed platform that allows multiple nodes to update a distributed ledger in a tamper-resistant manner. The decentralized nature of this system suggests that it can be an effective tool for battlefields in securing data communication among Internet-of-Battlefield Things (IoBT). In this paper, we integrate a permissioned blockchain, namely Hyperledger Sawtooth, in IoBT context and evaluate its performance with the goal of determining whether it has the potential to serve the performance needs of IoBT environment. Using different testing parameters, the metric data would help in suggesting the best parameter set, network configuration and blockchain usability views in IoBT context. We show that a blockchain-integrated IoBT platform has heavy dependency on the characteristics of the underlying network such as topology, link bandwidth, jitter, and other communication configurations, that can be tuned up to achieve optimal performance.

2017
Ghosh, U., Chatterjee, P., Tosh, D., Shetty, S., Xiong, K., Kamhoua, C..  2017.  An SDN Based Framework for Guaranteeing Security and Performance in Information-Centric Cloud Networks. 2017 IEEE 10th International Conference on Cloud Computing (CLOUD). :749–752.

Cloud data centers are critical infrastructures to deliver cloud services. Although security and performance of cloud data centers have been well studied in the past, their networking aspects are overlooked. Current network infrastructures in cloud data centers limit the ability of cloud provider to offer guaranteed cloud network resources to users. In order to ensure security and performance requirements as defined in the service level agreement (SLA) between cloud user and provider, cloud providers need the ability to provision network resources dynamically and on the fly. The main challenge for cloud provider in utilizing network resource can be addressed by provisioning virtual networks that support information centric services by separating the control plane from the cloud infrastructure. In this paper, we propose an sdn based information centric cloud framework to provision network resources in order to support elastic demands of cloud applications depending on SLA requirements. The framework decouples the control plane and data plane wherein the conceptually centralized control plane controls and manages the fully distributed data plane. It computes the path to ensure security and performance of the network. We report initial experiment on average round-trip delay between consumers and producers.

2015
Tosh, D., Sengupta, S., Kamhoua, C., Kwiat, K., Martin, A..  2015.  An evolutionary game-theoretic framework for cyber-threat information sharing. 2015 IEEE International Conference on Communications (ICC). :7341–7346.

The initiative to protect against future cyber crimes requires a collaborative effort from all types of agencies spanning industry, academia, federal institutions, and military agencies. Therefore, a Cybersecurity Information Exchange (CYBEX) framework is required to facilitate breach/patch related information sharing among the participants (firms) to combat cyber attacks. In this paper, we formulate a non-cooperative cybersecurity information sharing game that can guide: (i) the firms (players)1 to independently decide whether to “participate in CYBEX and share” or not; (ii) the CYBEX framework to utilize the participation cost dynamically as incentive (to attract firms toward self-enforced sharing) and as a charge (to increase revenue). We analyze the game from an evolutionary game-theoretic strategy and determine the conditions under which the players' self-enforced evolutionary stability can be achieved. We present a distributed learning heuristic to attain the evolutionary stable strategy (ESS) under various conditions. We also show how CYBEX can wisely vary its pricing for participation to increase sharing as well as its own revenue, eventually evolving toward a win-win situation.