Visible to the public Biblio

Filters: Author is Volgyesi, Peter  [Clear All Filters]
2017-04-24
Neema, Himanshu, Volgyesi, Peter, Potteiger, Bradley, Emfinger, William, Koutsoukos, Xenofon, Karsai, Gabor, Vorobeychik, Yevgeniy, Sztipanovits, Janos.  2016.  SURE: An Experimentation and Evaluation Testbed for CPS Security and Resilience: Demo Abstract. Proceedings of the 7th International Conference on Cyber-Physical Systems. :27:1–27:1.

In-depth consideration and evaluation of security and resilience is necessary for developing the scientific foundations and technology of Cyber-Physical Systems (CPS). In this demonstration, we present SURE [1], a CPS experimentation and evaluation testbed for security and resilience focusing on transportation networks. The testbed includes (1) a heterogeneous modeling and simulation integration platform, (2) a Web-based tool for modeling CPS in adversarial environments, and (3) a framework for evaluating resilience using attacker-defender games. Users such as CPS designers and operators can interact with the testbed to evaluate monitoring and control schemes that include sensor placement and traffic signal configuration.

2019-02-13
Neema, Himanshu, Potteiger, Bradley, Koutsoukos, Xenofon, Karsai, Gabor, Volgyesi, Peter, Sztipanovits, Janos.  2018.  Integrated Simulation Testbed for Security and Resilience of CPS. Proceedings of the 33rd Annual ACM Symposium on Applied Computing. :368–374.
Owing1 to an immense growth of internet-connected and learning-enabled cyber-physical systems (CPSs) [1], several new types of attack vectors have emerged. Analyzing security and resilience of these complex CPSs is difficult as it requires evaluating many subsystems and factors in an integrated manner. Integrated simulation of physical systems and communication network can provide an underlying framework for creating a reusable and configurable testbed for such analyses. Using a model-based integration approach and the IEEE High-Level Architecture (HLA) [2] based distributed simulation software; we have created a testbed for integrated evaluation of large-scale CPS systems. Our tested supports web-based collaborative metamodeling and modeling of CPS system and experiments and a cloud computing environment for executing integrated networked co-simulations. A modular and extensible cyber-attack library enables validating the CPS under a variety of configurable cyber-attacks, such as DDoS and integrity attacks. Hardware-in-the-loop simulation is also supported along with several hardware attacks. Further, a scenario modeling language allows modeling of alternative paths (Courses of Actions) that enables validating CPS under different what-if scenarios as well as conducting cyber-gaming experiments. These capabilities make our testbed well suited for analyzing security and resilience of CPS. In addition, the web-based modeling and cloud-hosted execution infrastructure enables one to exercise the entire testbed using simply a web-browser, with integrated live experimental results display.
2020-10-05
Zhou, Xingyu, Li, Yi, Barreto, Carlos A., Li, Jiani, Volgyesi, Peter, Neema, Himanshu, Koutsoukos, Xenofon.  2019.  Evaluating Resilience of Grid Load Predictions under Stealthy Adversarial Attacks. 2019 Resilience Week (RWS). 1:206–212.
Recent advances in machine learning enable wider applications of prediction models in cyber-physical systems. Smart grids are increasingly using distributed sensor settings for distributed sensor fusion and information processing. Load forecasting systems use these sensors to predict future loads to incorporate into dynamic pricing of power and grid maintenance. However, these inference predictors are highly complex and thus vulnerable to adversarial attacks. Moreover, the adversarial attacks are synthetic norm-bounded modifications to a limited number of sensors that can greatly affect the accuracy of the overall predictor. It can be much cheaper and effective to incorporate elements of security and resilience at the earliest stages of design. In this paper, we demonstrate how to analyze the security and resilience of learning-based prediction models in power distribution networks by utilizing a domain-specific deep-learning and testing framework. This framework is developed using DeepForge and enables rapid design and analysis of attack scenarios against distributed smart meters in a power distribution network. It runs the attack simulations in the cloud backend. In addition to the predictor model, we have integrated an anomaly detector to detect adversarial attacks targeting the predictor. We formulate the stealthy adversarial attacks as an optimization problem to maximize prediction loss while minimizing the required perturbations. Under the worst-case setting, where the attacker has full knowledge of both the predictor and the detector, an iterative attack method has been developed to solve for the adversarial perturbation. We demonstrate the framework capabilities using a GridLAB-D based power distribution network model and show how stealthy adversarial attacks can affect smart grid prediction systems even with a partial control of network.