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Bai, Kunpeng, Wu, Chuankun, Zhang, Zhenfeng.  2018.  Protect white-box AES to resist table composition attacks. IET Information Security. 12:305–313.
White-box cryptography protects cryptographic software in a white-box attack context (WBAC), where the dynamic execution of the cryptographic software is under full control of an adversary. Protecting AES in the white-box setting attracted many scientists and engineers, and several solutions emerged. However, almost all these solutions have been badly broken by various efficient white-box attacks, which target compositions of key-embedding lookup tables. In 2014, Luo, Lai, and You proposed a new WBAC-oriented AES implementation, and claimed that their implementation is secure against both Billet et al.'s attack and De Mulder et al.'s attack. In this study, based on the existing table-composition-targeting cryptanalysis techniques, the authors show that the secret key of the Luo-Lai-You (LLY) implementation can be recovered with a time complexity of about 244. Furthermore, the authors propose a new white-box AES implementation based on table lookups, which is shown to be resistant against the existing table-composition-targeting white-box attacks. The authors, key-embedding tables are obfuscated with large affine mappings, which cannot be cancelled out by table compositions of the existing cryptanalysis techniques. Although their implementation requires twice as much memory as the LLY WBAES to store the tables, its speed is about 63 times of the latter.
Zhang, Lin, Zhang, Zhenfeng, Hu, Xuexian.  2016.  UC-secure Two-Server Password-Based Authentication Protocol and Its Applications. Proceedings of the 11th ACM on Asia Conference on Computer and Communications Security. :153–164.

A two-server password-based authentication (2PA) protocol is a special kind of authentication primitive that provides additional protection for the user's password. Through a 2PA protocol, a user can distribute his low-entropy password between two authentication servers in the initialization phase and authenticate himself merely via a matching password in the login phase. No single server can learn any information about the user's password, nor impersonate the legitimate user to authenticate to the honest server. In this paper, we first formulate and realize the security definition of two-server password-based authentication in the well-known universal composability (UC) framework, which thus provides desirable properties such as composable security. We show that our construction is suitable for the asymmetric communication model in which one server acts as the front-end server interacting directly with the user and the other stays backstage. Then, we show that our protocol could be easily extended to more complicate password-based cryptographic protocols such as two-server password-authenticated key exchange (2PAKE) and two-server password-authenticated secret sharing (2PASS), which enjoy stronger security guarantees and better efficiency performances in comparison with the existing schemes.