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Jia, Ruoxi, Dong, Roy, Sastry, S. Shankar, Spanos, Costas J..  2017.  Privacy-enhanced Architecture for Occupancy-based HVAC Control. Proceedings of the 8th International Conference on Cyber-Physical Systems. :177–186.

Large-scale sensing and actuation infrastructures have allowed buildings to achieve significant energy savings; at the same time, these technologies introduce significant privacy risks that must be addressed. In this paper, we present a framework for modeling the trade-off between improved control performance and increased privacy risks due to occupancy sensing. More specifically, we consider occupancy-based HVAC control as the control objective and the location traces of individual occupants as the private variables. Previous studies have shown that individual location information can be inferred from occupancy measurements. To ensure privacy, we design an architecture that distorts the occupancy data in order to hide individual occupant location information while maintaining HVAC performance. Using mutual information between the individual's location trace and the reported occupancy measurement as a privacy metric, we are able to optimally design a scheme to minimize privacy risk subject to a control performance guarantee. We evaluate our framework using real-world occupancy data: first, we verify that our privacy metric accurately assesses the adversary's ability to infer private variables from the distorted sensor measurements; then, we show that control performance is maintained through simulations of building operations using these distorted occupancy readings.

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Laszka, Aron, Abbas, Waseem, Sastry, S. Shankar, Vorobeychik, Yevgeniy, Koutsoukos, Xenofon.  2016.  Optimal Thresholds for Intrusion Detection Systems. Proceedings of the Symposium and Bootcamp on the Science of Security. :72–81.

In recent years, we have seen a number of successful attacks against high-profile targets, some of which have even caused severe physical damage. These examples have shown us that resourceful and determined attackers can penetrate virtually any system, even those that are secured by the "air-gap." Consequently, in order to minimize the impact of stealthy attacks, defenders have to focus not only on strengthening the first lines of defense but also on deploying effective intrusion-detection systems. Intrusion-detection systems can play a key role in protecting sensitive computer systems since they give defenders a chance to detect and mitigate attacks before they could cause substantial losses. However, an over-sensitive intrusion-detection system, which produces a large number of false alarms, imposes prohibitively high operational costs on a defender since alarms need to be manually investigated. Thus, defenders have to strike the right balance between maximizing security and minimizing costs. Optimizing the sensitivity of intrusion detection systems is especially challenging in the case when multiple inter-dependent computer systems have to be defended against a strategic attacker, who can target computer systems in order to maximize losses and minimize the probability of detection. We model this scenario as an attacker-defender security game and study the problem of finding optimal intrusion detection thresholds.