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Nguyen, Viet, Ibrahim, Mohamed, Truong, Hoang, Nguyen, Phuc, Gruteser, Marco, Howard, Richard, Vu, Tam.  2018.  Body-Guided Communications: A Low-Power, Highly-Confined Primitive to Track and Secure Every Touch. Proceedings of the 24th Annual International Conference on Mobile Computing and Networking. :353-368.

The growing number of devices we interact with require a convenient yet secure solution for user identification, authorization and authentication. Current approaches are cumbersome, susceptible to eavesdropping and relay attacks, or energy inefficient. In this paper, we propose a body-guided communication mechanism to secure every touch when users interact with a variety of devices and objects. The method is implemented in a hardware token worn on user's body, for example in the form of a wristband, which interacts with a receiver embedded inside the touched device through a body-guided channel established when the user touches the device. Experiments show low-power (uJ/bit) operation while achieving superior resilience to attacks, with the received signal at the intended receiver through the body channel being at least 20dB higher than that of an adversary in cm range.

S
Ali, Sk Subidh, Ibrahim, Mohamed, Sinanoglu, Ozgur, Chakrabarty, Krishnendu, Karri, Ramesh.  2016.  Security Assessment of Cyberphysical Digital Microfluidic Biochips. IEEE/ACM Trans. Comput. Biol. Bioinformatics. 13:445–458.

A digital microfluidic biochip (DMFB) is an emerging technology that enables miniaturized analysis systems for point-of-care clinical diagnostics, DNA sequencing, and environmental monitoring. A DMFB reduces the rate of sample and reagent consumption, and automates the analysis of assays. In this paper, we provide the first assessment of the security vulnerabilities of DMFBs. We identify result-manipulation attacks on a DMFB that maliciously alter the assay outcomes. Two practical result-manipulation attacks are shown on a DMFB platform performing enzymatic glucose assay on serum. In the first attack, the attacker adjusts the concentration of the glucose sample and thereby modifies the final result. In the second attack, the attacker tampers with the calibration curve of the assay operation. We then identify denial-of-service attacks, where the attacker can disrupt the assay operation by tampering either with the droplet-routing algorithm or with the actuation sequence. We demonstrate these attacks using a digital microfluidic synthesis simulator. The results show that the attacks are easy to implement and hard to detect. Therefore, this work highlights the need for effective protections against malicious modifications in DMFBs.