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Su, Fang-Hsiang, Bell, Jonathan, Harvey, Kenneth, Sethumadhavan, Simha, Kaiser, Gail, Jebara, Tony.  2016.  Code Relatives: Detecting Similarly Behaving Software. Proceedings of the 2016 24th ACM SIGSOFT International Symposium on Foundations of Software Engineering. :702–714.

Detecting “similar code” is useful for many software engineering tasks. Current tools can help detect code with statically similar syntactic and–or semantic features (code clones) and with dynamically similar functional input/output (simions). Unfortunately, some code fragments that behave similarly at the finer granularity of their execution traces may be ignored. In this paper, we propose the term “code relatives” to refer to code with similar execution behavior. We define code relatives and then present DyCLINK, our approach to detecting code relatives within and across codebases. DyCLINK records instruction-level traces from sample executions, organizes the traces into instruction-level dynamic dependence graphs, and employs our specialized subgraph matching algorithm to efficiently compare the executions of candidate code relatives. In our experiments, DyCLINK analyzed 422+ million prospective subgraph matches in only 43 minutes. We compared DyCLINK to one static code clone detector from the community and to our implementation of a dynamic simion detector. The results show that DyCLINK effectively detects code relatives with a reasonable analysis time.

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Zhang, Sheng, Tang, Adrian, Jiang, Zhewei, Sethumadhavan, Simha, Seok, Mingoo.  2018.  Blacklist Core: Machine-Learning Based Dynamic Operating-Performance-Point Blacklisting for Mitigating Power-Management Security Attacks. Proceedings of the International Symposium on Low Power Electronics and Design. :5:1-5:6.
Most modern computing devices make available fine-grained control of operating frequency and voltage for power management. These interfaces, as demonstrated by recent attacks, open up a new class of software fault injection attacks that compromise security on commodity devices. CLKSCREW, a recently-published attack that stretches the frequency of devices beyond their operational limits to induce faults, is one such attack. Statically and permanently limiting frequency and voltage modulation space, i.e., guard-banding, could mitigate such attacks but it incurs large performance degradation and long testing time. Instead, in this paper, we propose a run-time technique which dynamically blacklists unsafe operating performance points using a neural-net model. The model is first trained offline in the design time and then subsequently adjusted at run-time by inspecting a selected set of features such as power management control registers, timing-error signals, and core temperature. We designed the algorithm and hardware, titled a BlackList (BL) core, which is capable of detecting and mitigating such power management-based security attack at high accuracy. The BL core incurs a reasonably small amount of overhead in power, delay, and area.