Visible to the public Biblio

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Ménétrey, Jämes, Pasin, Marcelo, Felber, Pascal, Schiavoni, Valerio.  2021.  Twine: An Embedded Trusted Runtime for WebAssembly. 2021 IEEE 37th International Conference on Data Engineering (ICDE). :205—216.
WebAssembly is an Increasingly popular lightweight binary instruction format, which can be efficiently embedded and sandboxed. Languages like C, C++, Rust, Go, and many others can be compiled into WebAssembly. This paper describes Twine, a WebAssembly trusted runtime designed to execute unmodified, language-independent applications. We leverage Intel SGX to build the runtime environment without dealing with language-specific, complex APIs. While SGX hardware provides secure execution within the processor, Twine provides a secure, sandboxed software runtime nested within an SGX enclave, featuring a WebAssembly system interface (WASI) for compatibility with unmodified WebAssembly applications. We evaluate Twine with a large set of general-purpose benchmarks and real-world applications. In particular, we used Twine to implement a secure, trusted version of SQLite, a well-known full-fledged embeddable database. We believe that such a trusted database would be a reasonable component to build many larger application services. Our evaluation shows that SQLite can be fully executed inside an SGX enclave via WebAssembly and existing system interface, with similar average performance overheads. We estimate that the performance penalties measured are largely compensated by the additional security guarantees and its full compatibility with standard WebAssembly. An indepth analysis of our results indicates that performance can be greatly improved by modifying some of the underlying libraries. We describe and implement one such modification in the paper, showing up to 4.1 × speedup. Twine is open-source, available at GitHub along with instructions to reproduce our experiments.
Havet, Aurélien, Pires, Rafael, Felber, Pascal, Pasin, Marcelo, Rouvoy, Romain, Schiavoni, Valerio.  2017.  SecureStreams: A Reactive Middleware Framework for Secure Data Stream Processing. Proceedings of the 11th ACM International Conference on Distributed and Event-based Systems. :124–133.
The growing adoption of distributed data processing frameworks in a wide diversity of application domains challenges end-to-end integration of properties like security, in particular when considering deployments in the context of large-scale clusters or multi-tenant Cloud infrastructures. This paper therefore introduces SecureStreams, a reactive middleware framework to deploy and process secure streams at scale. Its design combines the high-level reactive dataflow programming paradigm with Intel®'s low-level software guard extensions (SGX) in order to guarantee privacy and integrity of the processed data. The experimental results of SecureStreams are promising: while offering a fluent scripting language based on Lua, our middleware delivers high processing throughput, thus enabling developers to implement secure processing pipelines in just few lines of code.
Pires, Rafael, Pasin, Marcelo, Felber, Pascal, Fetzer, Christof.  2016.  Secure Content-Based Routing Using Intel Software Guard Extensions. Proceedings of the 17th International Middleware Conference. :10:1–10:10.

Content-based routing (CBR) is a powerful model that supports scalable asynchronous communication among large sets of geographically distributed nodes. Yet, preserving privacy represents a major limitation for the wide adoption of CBR, notably when the routers are located in public clouds. Indeed, a CBR router must see the content of the messages sent by data producers, as well as the filters (or subscriptions) registered by data consumers. This represents a major deterrent for companies for which data is a key asset, as for instance in the case of financial markets or to conduct sensitive business-to-business transactions. While there exists some techniques for privacy-preserving computation, they are either prohibitively slow or too limited to be usable in real systems. In this paper, we follow a different strategy by taking advantage of trusted hardware extensions that have just been introduced in off-the-shelf processors and provide a trusted execution environment. We exploit Intel's new software guard extensions (SGX) to implement a CBR engine in a secure enclave. Thanks to the hardware-based trusted execution environment (TEE), the compute-intensive CBR operations can operate on decrypted data shielded by the enclave and leverage efficient matching algorithms. Extensive experimental evaluation shows that SGX adds only limited overhead to insecure plaintext matching outside secure enclaves while providing much better performance and more powerful filtering capabilities than alternative software-only solutions. To the best of our knowledge, this work is the first to demonstrate the practical benefits of SGX for privacy-preserving CBR.