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Acar, Gunes, Huang, Danny Yuxing, Li, Frank, Narayanan, Arvind, Feamster, Nick.  2018.  Web-Based Attacks to Discover and Control Local IoT Devices. Proceedings of the 2018 Workshop on IoT Security and Privacy. :29-35.
In this paper, we present two web-based attacks against local IoT devices that any malicious web page or third-party script can perform, even when the devices are behind NATs. In our attack scenario, a victim visits the attacker's website, which contains a malicious script that communicates with IoT devices on the local network that have open HTTP servers. We show how the malicious script can circumvent the same-origin policy by exploiting error messages on the HTML5 MediaError interface or by carrying out DNS rebinding attacks. We demonstrate that the attacker can gather sensitive information from the devices (e.g., unique device identifiers and precise geolocation), track and profile the owners to serve ads, or control the devices by playing arbitrary videos and rebooting. We propose potential countermeasures to our attacks that users, browsers, DNS providers, and IoT vendors can implement.
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Carlsten, Miles, Kalodner, Harry, Weinberg, S. Matthew, Narayanan, Arvind.  2016.  On the Instability of Bitcoin Without the Block Reward. Proceedings of the 2016 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security. :154–167.

Bitcoin provides two incentives for miners: block rewards and transaction fees. The former accounts for the vast majority of miner revenues at the beginning of the system, but it is expected to transition to the latter as the block rewards dwindle. There has been an implicit belief that whether miners are paid by block rewards or transaction fees does not affect the security of the block chain. We show that this is not the case. Our key insight is that with only transaction fees, the variance of the block reward is very high due to the exponentially distributed block arrival time, and it becomes attractive to fork a "wealthy" block to "steal" the rewards therein. We show that this results in an equilibrium with undesirable properties for Bitcoin's security and performance, and even non-equilibria in some circumstances. We also revisit selfish mining and show that it can be made profitable for a miner with an arbitrarily low hash power share, and who is arbitrarily poorly connected within the network. Our results are derived from theoretical analysis and confirmed by a new Bitcoin mining simulator that may be of independent interest. We discuss the troubling implications of our results for Bitcoin's future security and draw lessons for the design of new cryptocurrencies.