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Khalid, Ayesha, Oder, Tobias, Valencia, Felipe, O' Neill, Maire, Güneysu, Tim, Regazzoni, Francesco.  2018.  Physical Protection of Lattice-Based Cryptography: Challenges and Solutions. Proceedings of the 2018 on Great Lakes Symposium on VLSI. :365–370.

The impending realization of scalable quantum computers will have a significant impact on today's security infrastructure. With the advent of powerful quantum computers public key cryptographic schemes will become vulnerable to Shor's quantum algorithm, undermining the security current communications systems. Post-quantum (or quantum-resistant) cryptography is an active research area, endeavoring to develop novel and quantum resistant public key cryptography. Amongst the various classes of quantum-resistant cryptography schemes, lattice-based cryptography is emerging as one of the most viable options. Its efficient implementation on software and on commodity hardware has already been shown to compete and even excel the performance of current classical security public-key schemes. This work discusses the next step in terms of their practical deployment, i.e., addressing the physical security of lattice-based cryptographic implementations. We survey the state-of-the-art in terms of side channel attacks (SCA), both invasive and passive attacks, and proposed countermeasures. Although the weaknesses exposed have led to countermeasures for these schemes, the cost, practicality and effectiveness of these on multiple implementation platforms, however, remains under-studied.

Liu, Zhe, Pöppelmann, Thomas, Oder, Tobias, Seo, Hwajeong, Roy, Sujoy Sinha, Güneysu, Tim, Großschädl, Johann, Kim, Howon, Verbauwhede, Ingrid.  2017.  High-Performance Ideal Lattice-Based Cryptography on 8-Bit AVR Microcontrollers. ACM Trans. Embed. Comput. Syst.. 16:117:1–117:24.
Over recent years lattice-based cryptography has received much attention due to versatile average-case problems like Ring-LWE or Ring-SIS that appear to be intractable by quantum computers. In this work, we evaluate and compare implementations of Ring-LWE encryption and the bimodal lattice signature scheme (BLISS) on an 8-bit Atmel ATxmega128 microcontroller. Our implementation of Ring-LWE encryption provides comprehensive protection against timing side-channels and takes 24.9ms for encryption and 6.7ms for decryption. To compute a BLISS signature, our software takes 317ms and 86ms for verification. These results underline the feasibility of lattice-based cryptography on constrained devices.
Buchmann, Johannes, Göpfert, Florian, Güneysu, Tim, Oder, Tobias, Pöppelmann, Thomas.  2016.  High-Performance and Lightweight Lattice-Based Public-Key Encryption. Proceedings of the 2Nd ACM International Workshop on IoT Privacy, Trust, and Security. :2–9.
In the emerging Internet of Things, lightweight public-key cryptography is an essential component for many cost-efficient security solutions. Since conventional public-key schemes, such as ECC and RSA, remain expensive and energy hungry even after aggressive optimization, this work investigates a possible alternative. In particular, we show the practical potential of replacing the Gaussian noise distribution in the Ring-LWE based encryption scheme by Lindner and Peikert/Lyubashevsky et al. with a binary distribution. When parameters are carefully chosen, our construction is resistant against any state-of-the-art cryptanalytic techniques (e.g., attacks on original Ring-LWE or NTRU) and suitable for low-cost scenarios. In the end, our scheme can enable public-key encryption even on very small and low-cost 8-bit (ATXmega128) and 32-bit (Cortex-M0) microcontrollers.
Schneider, Tobias, Moradi, Amir, Güneysu, Tim.  2016.  ParTI: Towards Combined Hardware Countermeasures Against Side-Channeland Fault-Injection Attacks. Proceedings of the 2016 ACM Workshop on Theory of Implementation Security. :39–39.

Side-channel analysis and fault-injection attacks are known as major threats to any cryptographic implementation. Protecting cryptographic implementations with suitable countermeasures is thus essential before they are deployed in the wild. However, countermeasures for both threats are of completely different nature: Side-channel analysis is mitigated by techniques that hide or mask key-dependent information while resistance against fault-injection attacks can be achieved by redundancy in the computation for immediate error detection. Since already the integration of any single countermeasure in cryptographic hardware comes with significant costs in terms of performance and area, a combination of multiple countermeasures is expensive and often associated with undesired side effects. In this work, we introduce a countermeasure for cryptographic hardware implementations that combines the concept of a provably-secure masking scheme (i.e., threshold implementation) with an error detecting approach against fault injection. As a case study, we apply our generic construction to the lightweight LED cipher. Our LED instance achieves first-order resistance against side-channel attacks combined with a fault detection capability that is superior to that of simple duplication for most error distributions at an increased area demand of 4.3%.

O'Neill, Maire, O'Sullivan, Elizabeth, McWilliams, Gavin, Saarinen, Markku-Juhani, Moore, Ciara, Khalid, Ayesha, Howe, James, del Pino, Rafael, Abdalla, Michel, Regazzoni, Francesco et al..  2016.  Secure Architectures of Future Emerging Cryptography SAFEcrypto. Proceedings of the ACM International Conference on Computing Frontiers. :315–322.

Funded under the European Union's Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme, SAFEcrypto will provide a new generation of practical, robust and physically secure post-quantum cryptographic solutions that ensure long-term security for future ICT systems, services and applications. The project will focus on the remarkably versatile field of Lattice-based cryptography as the source of computational hardness, and will deliver optimised public key security primitives for digital signatures and authentication, as well identity based encryption (IBE) and attribute based encryption (ABE). This will involve algorithmic and design optimisations, and implementations of lattice-based cryptographic schemes addressing cost, energy consumption, performance and physical robustness. As the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) prepares for the transition to a post-quantum cryptographic suite B, urging organisations that build systems and infrastructures that require long-term security to consider this transition in architectural designs; the SAFEcrypto project will provide Proof-of-concept demonstrators of schemes for three practical real-world case studies with long-term security requirements, in the application areas of satellite communications, network security and cloud. The goal is to affirm Lattice-based cryptography as an effective replacement for traditional number-theoretic public-key cryptography, by demonstrating that it can address the needs of resource-constrained embedded applications, such as mobile and battery-operated devices, and of real-time high performance applications for cloud and network management infrastructures.