Visible to the public Biblio

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Conference Paper
Lee, P., Tseng, C..  2019.  On the Layer Choice of the Image Style Transfer Using Convolutional Neural Networks. 2019 IEEE International Conference on Consumer Electronics - Taiwan (ICCE-TW). :1—2.

In this paper, the layer choices of the image style transfer method using the VGG-19 neural network are studied. The VGG-19 network is used to extract the feature maps which have their implicit meaning as a learning basis. If the layers for stylistic learning are not suitably chosen, the quality of style transferred image may not look good. After making experiments, it can be observed that the color information is concentrated on lower layers from conv1-1 to conv2-2, and texture information is concentrated on the middle layers from conv3-1 to conv4-4. As to the higher layers from conv5-1 to conv5-4, they seem to be able to depict image content well. Based on these observations, the methods of color transfer, texture transfer and style transfer are presented and make comparisons with conventional methods.

Journal Article
Lee, P., Clark, A., Bushnell, L., Poovendran, R..  2014.  A Passivity Framework for Modeling and Mitigating Wormhole Attacks on Networked Control Systems. Automatic Control, IEEE Transactions on. 59:3224-3237.

Networked control systems consist of distributed sensors and actuators that communicate via a wireless network. The use of an open wireless medium and unattended deployment leaves these systems vulnerable to intelligent adversaries whose goal is to disrupt the system performance. In this paper, we study the wormhole attack on a networked control system, in which an adversary establishes a link between two geographically distant regions of the network by using either high-gain antennas, as in the out-of-band wormhole, or colluding network nodes as in the in-band wormhole. Wormholes allow the adversary to violate the timing constraints of real-time control systems by first creating low-latency links, which attract network traffic, and then delaying or dropping packets. Since the wormhole attack reroutes and replays valid messages, it cannot be detected using cryptographic mechanisms alone. We study the impact of the wormhole attack on the network flows and delays and introduce a passivity-based control-theoretic framework for modeling and mitigating the wormhole attack. We develop this framework for both the in-band and out-of-band wormhole attacks as well as complex, hereto-unreported wormhole attacks consisting of arbitrary combinations of in-and out-of band wormholes. By integrating existing mitigation strategies into our framework, we analyze the throughput, delay, and stability properties of the overall system. Through simulation study, we show that, by selectively dropping control packets, the wormhole attack can cause disturbances in the physical plant of a networked control system, and demonstrate that appropriate selection of detection parameters mitigates the disturbances due to the wormhole while satisfying the delay constraints of the physical system.

Lee, P., Clark, A., Bushnell, L., Poovendran, R..  2014.  A Passivity Framework for Modeling and Mitigating Wormhole Attacks on Networked Control Systems. Automatic Control, IEEE Transactions on. 59:3224-3237.

Networked control systems consist of distributed sensors and actuators that communicate via a wireless network. The use of an open wireless medium and unattended deployment leaves these systems vulnerable to intelligent adversaries whose goal is to disrupt the system performance. In this paper, we study the wormhole attack on a networked control system, in which an adversary establishes a link between two geographically distant regions of the network by using either high-gain antennas, as in the out-of-band wormhole, or colluding network nodes as in the in-band wormhole. Wormholes allow the adversary to violate the timing constraints of real-time control systems by first creating low-latency links, which attract network traffic, and then delaying or dropping packets. Since the wormhole attack reroutes and replays valid messages, it cannot be detected using cryptographic mechanisms alone. We study the impact of the wormhole attack on the network flows and delays and introduce a passivity-based control-theoretic framework for modeling and mitigating the wormhole attack. We develop this framework for both the in-band and out-of-band wormhole attacks as well as complex, hereto-unreported wormhole attacks consisting of arbitrary combinations of in-and out-of band wormholes. By integrating existing mitigation strategies into our framework, we analyze the throughput, delay, and stability properties of the overall system. Through simulation study, we show that, by selectively dropping control packets, the wormhole attack can cause disturbances in the physical plant of a networked control system, and demonstrate that appropriate selection of detection parameters mitigates the disturbances due to the wormhole while satisfying the delay constraints of the physical system.